It is a fracture line that is becoming increasingly visible in a region shaken by war with Iran. It is the one that divides the Arab countries of the Gulf against each other. This division is important because it weighs on the crisis resolution, already difficult with the neither-war-nor-peace situation between Washington and Tehran, and dangerously complicates the regional situation once this crisis is overcome.
Two camps have gradually formed within countries that have in common the retaliation from Iranian strikes against American and Israeli interests. The two main actors are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which now have opposing visions and are engaged in a true “cold war.”
The Emirates, the main target of Iranian missiles and drones, have chosen to strengthen their relationship with Israel, the main regional power, to which they are bound by the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia, which did not sign these accords, has distanced itself from this hardline stance taken by its neighbor.
The most visible manifestation of the fracture was the recent decision of the United Arab Emirates to leave OPEC, the organization of oil-exporting countries; this had less to do with oil than with the relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
But the degradation predates the war with Iran. In December, the two countries were on the brink of confrontation over Yemen, where Saudi Arabia accused the Emirates of supporting separatist rebels. Riyadh gave Abu Dhabi 24 hours to withdraw its troops and was immediately followed through. This is even more surprising given that the two countries jointly launched a war in Yemen ten years ago.
A sign of this divergence was an article at the beginning of the week by Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence and ex-ambassador to Washington, discussing an Israeli plan to involve Saudi Arabia in a war against Iran. If this had happened, he writes, the region would have been destroyed, to the benefit of Israel. This thesis is in stark contrast to the position of the Emirates, who, as we learned yesterday, directly struck Iran in April. This shows how the region has evolved in different directions in recent months.
The Emirates and Saudi Arabia are facing each other on all fronts. In Sudan, the two countries support rival camps in the civil war ravaging the country. In Somaliland, the secessionist part of Somalia, the Emirates are on the side of the Israelis, who have just recognized this territory in front of Yemen, while Riyadh supports Somalia. In Lebanon, the Saudis are pressuring the Lebanese government to abandon negotiations with Israel and not establish relations with the Hebrew state as the Americans want.
Given the weight of the Emirates as well as Saudi Arabia, the divide extends throughout the region and beyond: Turkey and Pakistan are close to Riyadh and opposed to the UAE-Israel-US rapprochement.
The fallout from this war has shown the limits of American protection, the vulnerability of the Gulf Arab countries, and the Israeli hegemony over an agenda of its own. A whole regional balance is in need of reconstruction: the open conflagration in 2023 continues to destabilize the Middle East.
