By Antonis Ntavanellos
Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Athens on April 24th and 25th was warmly welcomed by the right-wing government and mainstream media.
During this visit, the Greco-French “defense” pact signed in Paris in 2021 [under the Kyriakos Mitsotakis government] was renewed for the next five years. Indeed, as both Mitsotakis and Macron declared, “automatic mechanisms” have been integrated into the terms of the agreement, giving it “unlimited” validity. The agreement includes a “mutual defense” clause that commits France to assist Greece with military support if it is attacked or faces belligerent pressures. Macron left no room for doubt in his public statement: “If you believe your sovereign rights are threatened, reinforce yourself… If ever you need us, we will be there.” He concluded by chanting a popular slogan in Greek bourgeois politics from the late 1970s: “Greece-France Alliance.”
The most substantial part of the meeting focused on armament contracts and the war economy. The Greek government had already purchased [contract signed in 2021] 24 Rafale fighter jets and 4 frigates FDI-Belhara from France, costing over 10 billion euros. Current negotiations involve new orders for 2+2 French submarines (Naval Group’s Barracuda) and, primarily, additional missile and electronic systems for Rafale aircraft and Belhara frigates. Macron was accompanied by dozens of representatives from French companies [1], mainly in the arms industry, during his visit to Athens. They had the opportunity to speak directly with the “coordinators” of about 400 Greek companies that have ventured into the arms industry, after Mitsotakis ensured that at least 25% of the resources of the government’s ten-year military spending program would be allocated to the private sector, aiming to strengthen the national defense industry. According to the Greek press, major companies (such as shipyards in Salamis, Elefsina, and Metlen, which collaborates with Naval Group) will be part of the supply and production chains for giants such as Naval Group, Dassault, and others.
Macron’s agenda during his visit to Athens included a proposal for Greek participation in the French nuclear program. Discussions on this topic were highly “confidential,” both in media reports and official public statements, as the vast majority of the Greek public remains hostile or skeptical about nuclear energy. It also included a proposal for a joint Franco-Greek initiative regarding “navigation security in the Strait of Hormuz,” if and when conflicts in the Gulf cease. In this scenario, France would contribute its armed forces, and Greek shipowners would offer their expertise in conducting business in this unstable region.
In his public speech in Athens, Macron defended “European strategic autonomy” and made several sharp remarks about Trump’s policies. In this sensitive area marked by growing divergence between the major powers of euro-atlanticism, Mitsotakis is trying to keep a foot in all camps.
Through its armaments programs, Greece ensures it maintains “cordial” relations with all major European powers. Recently, the Greek government ordered four additional FREMM-class frigates from the Italian shipyard Fincantieri. A high-level delegation from the German government visited Athens in early May to discuss armament contracts and the participation of Greek companies in Leopard tank production modernization programs, for which the Greek army has proven to be a good customer [2].
However, there is no doubt that in the military and geopolitical sphere, the absolute priority of the Greek state is its relationship with the United States. The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) between Greece and the United States grants the latter unlimited and completely “unrestricted” access to military installations in Greek territory. This has led to the expansion and massive growth of US military bases in the country. Today, the port of Souda in Crete is considered the largest US naval base in the Mediterranean. The port of Alexandroupoli in the north of the country is the “gateway” of NATO’s land corridor to the Black Sea and Ukraine. It is also the main transshipment port for liquefied natural gas (LNG) which, via the “vertical corridor” of land gas pipelines (Vertical Gas Corridor-VGC), will be transported to Ukraine, as well as to the markets of Eastern Balkans and Central Europe. In central Greece, in Thessaly, the Larissa and Stefanoviki bases serve as rear bases for the “rapid deployment forces” that the United States maintains in the region through NATO.
In return, the Greek government has secured a privileged relationship with the United States compared to Turkey, as well as Greece’s participation in the F-35 advanced combat aircraft production program. The gradual delivery of the first F-35s over the next two years, alongside the French Rafales, is expected to give the Greek Air Force the coveted “military edge” in the region.
With Trump’s second term, Kimberly Guilfoyle arrived in Athens as the US ambassador. She is a controversial figure known for her appearances on Fox News and was, for a time, engaged to Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr. However, she is pursuing an extremely ambitious and demanding policy. She advocated for the port of Elefsina near Athens to become a military and commercial “hub” exclusively for the United States, along with Volos Port in addition to the Larissa and Stefanoviki bases, and the port of Kavala to support a major expansion of Alexandroupoli, as well as an unlimited expansion of US “operations” in Crete.
Gradually, Kimberly Guilfoyle raised the issue of canceling privatization contracts for the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki, which were sold to the Chinese company Cosco and the Savvidis family during the crisis years, considered linked to Russian interests. Her main target has been the Piraeus port and the Chinese company Cosco.
The Mitsotakis government initially announced that it would honor its international agreements and that the Piraeus-Cosco issue was “not up for debate.”
In practice, however, things are getting complicated. It was recently announced that an American-made X-ray system would be installed at Piraeus to thoroughly inspect the contents of all containers passing through this major port via Cosco. Kimberly Guilfoyle attended the system installation ceremony as the keynote speaker and stated that it is part of US security policy, considering it an integral part of the Greek-American MDCA agreement. Managing Chinese reactions – coming from a significant “player” like Cosco – has been left as a problem and a “headache” for Mitsotakis.
American policy intensity is not limited to the demand to curb Greece’s “flexibility” in its relations with Eurasian powers. It also extends to US opposition to projects aimed at strengthening “European strategic autonomy.” An interpretation of the media silence accompanying the discussions between Macron and Mitsotakis concerning Greek participation in the French nuclear program is that the Greek government sought to avoid the possibility of negative reactions from the US Embassy in Athens.
To better understand the close connection between the Greek government’s policy and US priorities, one must consider the deepening of Greek-Israeli relations. In recent years, the diplomatic and military “3+1” framework (Greece-Cyprus-Israel + the United States) has resumed its role as the “arc of contention” against the rivals of the euro-atlantic powers in the eastern Mediterranean. Two major changes have emerged with the advent of this new context: 1) the relative marginalization of Turkey as a “punishment” for Erdogan’s flexible foreign policy; 2) the qualitative revaluation of Israel’s role, including within Greece and Cyprus.
In recent years, Israel has conducted frequent military exercises in Greece (simulating a military attack against Iran). A significant part of the training of Greek Air Force pilots has been entrusted to Israel. Israeli arms, software, and intelligence companies are participating in the Greek defense industry through major investments and the provision of their expertise. Recently, the Mitsotakis government approved a comprehensive anti-missile and anti-drone defense program for the Aegean Sea, named the “Achilles Shield.” In practice, this means an extension of the Israeli Iron Dome into the Aegean Sea. It is certain that the command center of this system will be located in Tel Aviv, just as Netanyahu undoubtedly has hegemony over the Greece-Cyprus-Israel “axis.”
The specific goal of the Greek state in this shareholder orientation is to gain an “advantage” over Turkey in the competition between the two parties for domination of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas.
This “game” is certainly understood on the other side of the Aegean Sea. The Turkish press reacted to Macron’s visit to Athens and the subsequent statements, concurring that there is an attempt to “encircle Turkey.” It should not be forgotten that Turkey is a large country with a population and economy much larger than those of Greece, possessing a powerful army and a now strong defense industry. Therefore, no one can underestimate its capacity to retaliate.
The danger has not gone unnoticed in Athens. The establishment’s “serious” newspaper To Vima described it, attributing these words to an experienced Greek diplomat: “Perhaps Turkey has endured more pressure than it can handle.” Until a few years ago, Athens held the reins of decisions between “tension” and “accommodation” with Turkey. It is now evident that the Netanyahu government in Tel Aviv holds them. The possibility that Israel might decide to “exploit” Greek-Turkish disagreements to serve its own interests by altering the balance of power in the Middle East, broadly defined, could lead to uncontrollable and catastrophic clashes for all the peoples of the region.
Rivalries between local and regional powers, against the backdrop of escalating global tensions, are becoming extremely dangerous. Those of us who fight for workers’ and social rights and solidarity with the Palestinian people must intensify our action against the arms race and the strengthening of ties with contemporary major powers. We must combat the policies outlined in various “war pacts,” such as those recently concluded between Greece, France, and the United States. (Article received on May 8, 2026; translation-editing by A l’Encontre)
Antonis Ntavanellos: host of DEA and editor of the journal Ergatiki Aristera.
[1] Le Monde of April 25, 2026, stated: “Today, some 200 French companies employing 17,000 workers are established in the country, and French investments, valued at €2 billion in 2025 (out of €12 billion in total), have jumped over 50% in the last five years, according to the French-Greek Chamber of Commerce.” (Ed.)
[2] German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated: “Greece is a strategic pillar for us in southeastern Europe, a close friend and partner within the European Union and NATO. Today’s visit to Athens is a clear signal: Germany and Greece are getting even closer – for a Europe that protects its interests, defends its values, and is capable of acting in an increasingly tough world.”
However, according to the Greek website efsyn.gr, the German minister complained about the limits of cooperation in terms of armaments between Greece and Germany. The visit was intended to make up for this lag. Thus, efsyn.gr indicates: “Greek-German relations in the armament sector are entering a new, more complex phase, where diplomacy, geopolitical interests, and economic choices intersect. Despite positive statements from both sides, the balances remain fragile, with Berlin seeking a more significant role in Greek armament programs and Athens evaluating its decisions against broader strategic criteria.” (Ed.)
