The European Union was founded on a vision of the world marked by economic liberalism, multilateralism, and globalization. This vision seems to have lost some of its appeal today.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the geopolitical dimension of EU membership and forced the Union to develop a response both economically and in terms of security. The aggressive stance of the American administration, particularly regarding tariffs and threats towards Greenland, has strained transatlantic relations. Additionally, China’s economic model and global ambitions continue to pose challenges for the EU and its single market.
The EU has been aware of this new reality for some time now. It has consistently strengthened its ability to impose sanctions on countries and entities that violate international law, effectively severing most of its trade ties with Russia. It has also adopted the anti-coercion instrument, allowing it to take countermeasures against any country using trade to interfere in the political or regulatory choices of the EU or its member states. The EU has adopted and reformed rules on controlling incoming foreign direct investments when they pose a threat to security or public order.
In a context of such geopolitical turbulence, trade is not just an economic issue, but also a security concern. Trade links, the unconditional development of cross-border logistic chains, and dependence on sources of energy or natural resources outside of Europe create geopolitical vulnerabilities. These dependencies come with conditions.
The EU’s response must be both proactive and defensive. On one hand, the EU should continue to diversify by strengthening relationships with more trading partners, for example by forming new agreements with countries in South America and Australia. This diversification should specifically address rare earths used in essential civil and military infrastructure. Europe should not resort to protectionism simply because others are doing so.
The liberal vision of European integration still resonates and can be reconciled with current geopolitical circumstances. By diversifying its trading partners, the EU should avoid creating new dependencies while trying to escape from old ones.
On the other hand, the EU should refine its trade arsenal and be prepared to defend its own interests against threats. The issue is not that the EU lacks tools for defense. The challenge lies in the fact that threats now come not only from adversaries but also from allies. This limits the EU’s ability to act defensively. A trade war with the United States, for example, would not only be costly for European consumers economically but could also lead to a complete withdrawal of US support for Ukraine, increasing the security risk for Europe.
The EU’s ability to defend its commercial interests depends on its ability to defend its security interests. Europe’s strategic autonomy, its ability to act independently to defend its interests, is therefore an existential prerequisite. However, strategic autonomy cannot be achieved overnight. It requires a coherent development of policies and effective implementation. Above all, it requires political actors, both at the national and EU levels, to raise awareness among citizens about the issues at stake and inform them of the necessary compromises.
Mark Konstantinidis is a postdoctoral researcher at the Luxembourg Centre for European Law at the University of Luxembourg. He earned his Ph.D. at King’s College London, UK, where he is still a visiting lecturer. His research focuses on European law, international economic law, and international arbitration.
This article was originally published in English. It has been translated with the help of AI and reviewed by individuals.
