Since the first American and Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and many leaders of the Tehran regime, and a few hours before the announced end of the ceasefire, which President Donald Trump finally extended on Tuesday, April 21, we struggle to understand who is governing the country. Clément Therme, a historian of international relations and specialist in the Islamic Republic, sheds light on the inner workings of “this fragmented power.” Teaching at the University of Montpellier Paul-Valéry, research associate at the International Institute of Iranian Studies (Rasanah), and at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), he has just published with Editions Tallandier “Iran-Israel: the ideological war,” which analyzes over fifty years of conflict that has reached an unprecedented intensity and now affects the entire planet.
Do we really know who is leading Iran today? According to what principles? Clément Therme – This question refers to the nature of the Iranian regime, which can be defined as a fragmented authoritarianism. Several centers of power coexist. Certainly, there is a central authority, the office of the Supreme Leader. But since the elimination, on February 28, of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the question of his succession arises. Formally, [his son] Mojtaba Khamenei has taken over, but for reasons of security, and perhaps health, he has not appeared, and we do not know exactly his cognitive state. Therefore, we must look at his entourage.
We can mention the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Ahmad Vahidi, known for being one of the officials behind the attack against the Jewish community in Buenos Aires in 1994 [which killed 85 people and injured hundreds]. In the 1990s, he was responsible for the Qods Force – which means holy and designates Jerusalem – of the Revolutionary Guards, before Qassem Soleimani [a general who was in charge of this elite unit for operations abroad and the architect of Iranian expansionism in the Middle East, before being killed in 2020 by an American strike in Iraq]. He is an ideological activist, one of the promoters of the transnational ideology of the Islamic Republic.
It is necessary to understand that in Iran, we are not faced with classic decision-making processes, which would aim to promote national interests in a cost-benefit calculation. This does not mean that the ideological software is not understandable or that the Iranian state would make unpredictable decisions. It is a structured ideology, inherited from Ayatollah Khomeini [founder of the Islamic Republic in 1979], with some very limited adjustments in the 1990s – particularly regarding neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia. During the “40-day war,” Iran targeted its neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula, including its main regional economic partner, the United Arab Emirates – $57 billion in trade [€48 billion]. This decision does not respond to an economic logic but an ideological one, for the regime’s survival: behind it are the Abraham Accords [signed in 2020 under the auspices of the United States by several Arab capitals, including Abu Dhabi, to normalize their relations with the Hebrew state], so the question of the Israeli enemy and that of American and Western presence in the Emirates. By targeting these infrastructures, Iran pursued a tactical ideological goal. And then, there is also the issue of effect: with few military means, one obtains a maximum impact by sending a drone to Dubai, in terms of media repercussions.
So, the logic is that of the survival of the system in its current ideological form, but with a pragmatic application of principles: hatred of the United States, the destruction of Israel, and priority given to Muslim and non-aligned countries… All of this is enshrined in the Iranian constitution. From the Constitution, one can understand decision-making in foreign policy.
This certainly implies a difficulty in making compromises – we see this with the decision, which is delayed, to negotiate with the United States, in Islamabad, probably this Wednesday, April 21. There is a very powerful debate within the factions of the Islamic Republic, as there is an escalation against the American enemy. For some, even negotiating indirectly is already making a compromise. And so, institutional fragmentation strengthens the power of the ideology of the Islamic Republic.
We tend to talk about a bicameral power, divided between the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards. How do these two entities interact? In reality, there is no separation. This is what is called the myth of the military coup in Iran. For example, Hossein Taeb, head of the Revolutionary Guards intelligence from 2009 to 2022, is a cleric. There is no formal separation between the official clergy and the military power because the military power is a transnational ideological power. The Revolutionary Guards are guardians of the Islamic revolution – not Iranian. There is confusion because of the narrative of military normalization.
It is necessary to consider the ideological software. This transnational software of the Islamic Republic is intelligible. But one must not make sociological interpretations from the West to return to the cost-benefit calculation. We know what we did with the war in Ukraine. We said: “Putin will not invade Ukraine, because it is not good for the Russian economy.” Similarly, it was said that there would be no war between the Islamic Republic and Israel. In April 2024, the Islamic Republic sent missiles directly to Israel. All the television experts said it was impossible. There was even an article in the “Canard enchaîné” about it – making fun of the “fake experts.” It is because we do not want to think about the ideological software.
The idea of separating the Revolutionary Guards from the religious power is absurd. It does not work like that: the ideology binds those who are inside the system.
Then there is the question of the “Iranian Gorbachev.” Can Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the Speaker of Parliament, be an “Iranian Gorbachev”? This question has been around since the 1990s, initiated at the time by the opponents of the reformist president Mohammad Khatami [1997-2005], who labeled him as such. Since then, there has been talk of Hassan Rohani [president from 2013 to 2021], then Massoud Pezeshkian [the current president] and now Qalibaf. Because in the West, we want to have a diplomatic interlocutor. In fact, it is the reformist illusion – a facade that fuels the discourse of dialogue supporters compared to those of war. It is a strategy of Western manipulation, and an internal strategy for the regime’s survival. That is why there is debate about tactics: how to manage hostility towards the West? Should the ceasefire be extended for two weeks? Or, on the contrary, should we return to war to gain and ensure the survival of the regime?
Qalibaf, who is negotiating with Westerners today, is not a strong man. There has been no regime change in the Islamic Republic. The deep state – the office of the Supreme Leader – holds power. In summary, you have the visible State, which speaks to the enemy and maintains a discourse to keep the negotiations – and perhaps avoid a return to war – without concluding an agreement; and you have the revolutionary superstructure, hidden behind, which does not speak to the enemy, and makes the decisions.
War in the Middle East: Can Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf be Trump’s man within the Iranian regime? Is this hardcore nucleus around the Supreme Leader the real decision-maker? […] Read the full article on Le Nouvel Obs website.
