After establishing in the first two parts why the idea of a strategic alliance in the Southern Cone resurfaces, and what each country – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay – can concretely contribute to this framework, Trystan Mordrel now delves into the operational heart of his reflection: what could such an alliance actually look like?
This third article addresses four fundamental questions. First, the defense industry as a real cement: without industrial, military, and technological cooperation, any strategic integration remains superficial. The author develops the idea that true autonomy begins with joint production – drones, radars, frigates, satellites, cyber defense. Next, what type of alliance is conceivable, with a lucid discussion of the concept of a “Southern NATO” that goes beyond slavishly imitating the Atlantic model. Then, the American question, considering the relationship with Washington in a post-Trump context where the U.S. resumes its brutal interests. Finally, negotiating with China, the European Union, and India: how to build a continental mass capable of defending permanent interests against giants. A reflection that will resonate with those following the multipolar reorganization of the world and the contemporary European challenges.
The defense industry as a real cement is crucial for any potential military alliance. Diplomatic speeches and joint military exercises are not enough – true integration begins with joint production. Just as the European Union was born around coal and steel due to the heavy industry, the same reasoning applies to the Southern Cone today.
It is precisely here that an extraordinary historical opportunity emerges. Brazil already has a significant military industrial base, Argentina retains sophisticated technological capabilities, and Chile is gradually developing interesting naval and logistical competences. When intelligently integrated, these capabilities could completely transform the regional strategic balance.
Examples abound. Argentina could acquire future frigates, conventional submarines, or oceanic patrol vessels built partially or entirely in Brazilian shipyards instead of relying exclusively on European suppliers. In return, Argentine electronic systems, radars developed by INVAP, or satellite components could be integrated into Brazilian or Chilean platforms.
Chile brings a particularly important element that is still underanalyzed. The country’s gradual development of specific naval capacities, particularly linked to its Antarctic and southern ocean projection, is significant.
The transformation of naval and aerospace sectors in the Southern Cone, as well as shared training programs, standardized munitions, and joint operations, would lead to increased regional autonomy and operational capacity. This potential alliance could serve as a counterbalance to external suppliers, fostering independence and efficiency.
In conclusion, the vision of a Southern Cone alliance presents a strategic opportunity for the region to negotiate from a position of strength and unity amidst a changing global landscape dominated by continent-sized powers.
