Europe defense: hard core to be less dependent on the United States

Who pays, who decides, who protects?

When Europe’s security still depends largely on Washington, a simple question arises: how long can this model last? This is the key issue in the debate surrounding a more integrated European defense, designed to act more quickly and be less dependent on the United States.

The topic is not new. But it has taken on a new dimension since the return of high-intensity warfare to the continent, pressure on military budgets, and doubts about the long-term reliability of the American umbrella. Brussels has outlined a more precise framework with the European defense industrial strategy, followed by a roadmap towards 2030 that sets specific milestones on ammunition, drones, air defense, and joint procurement.

An EU of 27, but not only

The crux of the debate is whether to move forward as 27 or establish a core group of willing countries. The European Union, in its conclusions of March 6, 2025, chose to strengthen its defense sovereignty “in full coherence with NATO,” with a priority list of weapons and capabilities: air and missile defense, artillery, missiles, drones, cyber security, electronic warfare, and military mobility.

On the other hand, France has long advocated for a more flexible approach: bilateral and multilateral cooperation between “willing and capable” states, within the Union and beyond. This approach allows for quicker progress, avoiding the need for unanimous agreement from all member states. But it also poses a clear risk: a multi-speed Europe in defense, where smaller states are left out of major decisions.

In this configuration, larger industrial countries gain influence. Germany, Italy, France, as well as Poland or the Baltic countries, can influence programs, production chains, and capacity choices. Smaller states have less financial and industrial leeway. They can follow, cooperate, and make purchases, but they rarely set the pace.

What a core group would change

The idea of a Europe of 6 or 8 is more than a mere slogan. In concrete terms, it aims to concentrate efforts among a few willing states to invest together in future technologies and urgent military capabilities. Brussels is already moving in this direction with “capability coalitions” and a goal of 40% of joint purchases by the end of 2027. The logic is simple: buying separately costs more, prolongs timelines, and fragments European armies.

This method can benefit the strongest industrial players, ensuring volume, visibility to factories, and accelerating projects. It can also assist exposed armies on the eastern flank, who seek rapid deliveries in response to the Russian threat. The Franco-Polish declaration of April 20, 2026, highlights this approach, focusing on strengthening the European pillar of NATO, air defense, space, communications, and anti-drone systems.

The real issue: money, deadlines, and dependence

The debate does not just concern institutional architecture but also means. The European timeline is tight. The Commission aims to launch projects from the first half of 2026, secure funding, and achieve operational capabilities across several areas by the end of 2030. In other words, Europe does not have ten years ahead. It needs to produce more, faster, and closer to the front.

This is where dependence on the United States becomes a concrete political issue. Many European armies still rely heavily on equipment, software, ammunition, or logistical chains closely linked to the American market. As long as this dependence exists, European autonomy remains incomplete and is not guaranteed to disappear with a change in administration in the White House. This exact point is summarized by several European officials: building independent capabilities is essential as reversing course is no longer certain.

For citizens, the stakes are tangible. A more integrated European defense can support industrial employment, especially in cutting-edge sectors, and reduce equipment delays for the armies. However, it may also require more public funding in a context of tight budgets. The cost of inaction would be different: enduring dependence, scattered purchases, and an inability to respond quickly to a major crisis.

Between political unity and targeted coalitions

The known point of friction is the Union’s desire to maintain the 27-member framework for economic, budgetary, and industrial matters. On the other hand, several capitals advocate for more limited formats in defense, space, digital, or artificial intelligence. This combination is not inherently contradictory. It reflects a pragmatic Europe that advances in concentric circles when unanimity slows progress.

Supporters of a core group see it as the only way to address capability gaps promptly. Critics fear a fractured Union between decision-makers, funders, and implementers. Amid these two views, European institutions have already decided on one point: defense cannot wait any longer. The 2030 roadmap, industrial programs, and joint projects demonstrate that urgency is now acknowledged at the European level.

What to watch out for

The coming weeks will reveal whether European defense remains a political horizon or becomes a concrete reality. Monitoring the establishment of capability coalitions, the initial project launches in 2026, decisions on funding, and the ability of major states to lead others without fracturing the Union will be crucial. If the core group is established, it will swiftly impact budgets, industries, and power dynamics within the EU.