Radar Coverage and Air Defense

The conflicts in Ukraine and the Persian Gulf highlight a tactical reality. Radar detection infrastructures, pillars of any air defense, are prime targets, fixed, visible, and within range of low-cost drones. This structural vulnerability requires a profound revision of air defense protection doctrines.

1. The structural vulnerability of radar sites Long-range radar systems and anti-ballistic detection possess an operational characteristic that makes them vulnerable targets. They are, by nature, fixed or very immobile installations. Their positioning results from precise topographical studies — summits, cleared plateaus, areas without masking by terrain or structures — optimizing electromagnetic coverage but imposing geographical constraints.

Added to this physical constraint is their permanent electromagnetic signature during operation and their visibility on satellite imagery. Equipment like the AN/FPS-132 (early warning radar), AN/TPY-2 (ballistic missile tracking radar), or AN/FPS-117 (air surveillance radar) have been located and targeted by Iranian forces without prior external intelligence, with a simple consultation of Google Earth sufficient to identify their positions.

The same applies to Russian and Ukrainian radars. The attack on the Voronej-DM anti-ballistic surveillance radar near Armavir by a Ukrainian missile drone on May 23, 2024, perfectly illustrates this reality: a strategic equipment designed to protect Russian territory against intercontinental ballistic strikes was damaged by a relatively modestly designed craft. The list of destroyed or damaged radars in both conflicts is now long and extensively documented by numerous videos.

Another point: Fixity is not just geographical. It is also doctrinal since these systems were designed, deployed, and integrated into command architectures meant for conventional high-altitude threats, not for low radar signature drones flying at low altitudes.

2. Operational impact: the degradation of the air situation The destruction or neutralization of radar stations has an immediate and measurable consequence with a loss of air situation control in the affected sectors. In the context of Iranian strikes on American and Israeli infrastructures in the Gulf region, this degradation may have facilitated the penetration of certain missiles, detected later than expected.

The global impact has nevertheless been contained thanks to the presence of compensatory means: – AEGIS Cruisers equipped with the AN/SPY-1 (or SPY-6 in the latest versions) radar provide considerable onboard detection capability, mobile and difficult to neutralize in a first strike. – AWACS radar aircraft and E-2D Hawkeye: additional aircraft have been deployed from the United States to cover ground detection gaps. This reinforcement implicitly reflects the extent of losses in ground radars.

However, this compensatory system presents evident structural limits. Radar aircraft fleets are limited in number, subject to maintenance and crew rotation constraints incompatible with prolonged engagements. These airborne platforms also remain vulnerable, as demonstrated by the destruction of an American AWACS in Saudi Arabia. The American naval presence in the area is by definition temporary. In the medium term, the destruction of fixed ground radars will weigh lastingly on the detection capacities of Gulf countries, with no lasting solutions yet in place.

3. The silent revolution of missile drones: the end of strategic depth by distance For decades, strategic depth was measured in kilometers. A radar positioned 200 km behind the front line was considered relatively protected: few conventional weapons could reach that distance, and those that could — cruise missiles, ballistic missiles — required significant financial and logistical investments, mechanically limiting the volume of possible strikes.

This equation has been fundamentally disrupted. A long-range missile drone can now: – Cover several hundred to several thousand kilometers on a low-altitude trajectory, avoiding radar detection; – Strike with metric precision at ground equipment; – Cost between 15,000 and 30,000 euros per unit, compared to several million for a conventional cruise missile.

The cost-effectiveness ratio is thus radically asymmetric: an AN/TPY-2 radar represents an investment of several hundred million dollars; the drone capable of neutralizing it costs less than 20,000 euros. This economic asymmetry fundamentally changes the logic of defensive investment and necessitates a reconsideration of the enormous concept of strategic depth, which can no longer be defined solely by the distance to the front line.

Illustration: The radar coverage of French metropolitan airspace relies on fewer than fifteen sites. In the event of high-intensity conflict, these sites would be the primary targets of a first wave of attack — by cruise missiles and/or long-range drones. Their individual protection by short-range surface-to-air systems would quickly be overwhelmed by a determined attacker.

4. Historical lessons: Serbian doctrine and Soviet heritage Resilience to this threat is not a new problem. Two historical examples provide relevant doctrinal insights.

– Kosovo War (1999): The Serbian radar survival tactic. With only old Soviet-era radars — technically outdated but sufficiently mobile — the Serbian air defense developed an effective tactic of discontinuous and nomadic operation. – Vietnam War: A localized and decentralized application of similar principles had already allowed North Vietnamese forces to shoot down many American aircraft, despite the absence of systematic coverage of their territory. The main lesson is that mobility and rigorous mission management constitute an effective response to adverse technological superiority.

5. Doctrinal recommendations: towards a resilient radar architecture Ukrainian, Russian, Israeli, and American operational experiences converge on a set of principles that Western doctrines need to integrate quickly.

a) Prioritize the mobility of tactical and operational detection systems: – Future acquisitions of operational and tactical surveillance radars should systematically integrate real mobility as a criterion, not theoretical like some systems presented as “transportable” but requiring several days for deployment. – Potential deployment areas must be identified, mapped, and prepared in peacetime, so that site rotation is quick and operationally feasible.

b) Adopt a doctrine of discontinuous and reasoned emission: – Continuous operation of a radar is itself a vulnerability. An intermittent emission doctrine — based on rotation between active sites, centralized coordination, and rigorous management of emission windows — would substantially complicate adversary targeting efforts while maintaining acceptable overall coverage.

c) Enhance the punctual protection of sites with short-range anti-drone systems: – Even a mobile radar must have minimal protection against opportunistic drones. Short-range anti-drone defense systems (jammers, decoys, lightweight kinetic systems) should accompany each deployment. This punctual protection does not aim to stop a massive attack but to neutralize isolated drones operating in reconnaissance or opportunistic strike roles.

d) Harden fixed sites: – Certain radars, particularly long-range anti-ballistic radars positioned on the ground, cannot be made mobile by their nature. For these systems, the response should be physical hardening (reinforced shelters, antenna redundancy, rapid repair systems) and depth protection through multi-layer surface-to-air systems capable of simultaneously addressing drone and missile threats.

e) Integrate this section into the entire air defense system: – This approach must extend to weapon systems themselves, as seen in Ukrainian and Russian S-300, S-400, SAMP/T, or Patriot systems: increased mobility, frequent position changes, rigorous management of radar missions for weapon systems. Launcher protection must focus on both discretion and operational usage.

Conclusion The radar destruction observed in Ukraine, Russia, and the Gulf should not be seen as anecdotes specific to peripheral conflicts. They indicate a profound doctrinal shift applicable to all operation centers, including Western Europe.

It is striking to note that neither the United States nor Israel, despite benefiting from continuous Ukrainian operational experience since 2022, have effectively prevented the destruction of their own detection systems. This reflects the difficulty of quickly translating operational lessons into doctrinal and capacitive adaptations.

Air domain mastery no longer rests solely on the power of deployed systems but on their ability to survive an initial neutralization strike. Mobility, discontinuity of emission, multi-layer protection, and incompressible site hardening are now the pillars of a resilient detection architecture, awaiting the emergence of complementary detection solutions based on drones, satellites, or balloons. It is at this cost that air domain mastery can be maintained in the high-intensity conflicts of the 21st century.

O. Dujardin