The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gueorgui Tichiy, stated publicly what is rarely directly said by a Ukrainian diplomat: the United States “pay limited attention to foreign policy issues” – and Kyiv takes this into account in its work. The explanation is simple: Washington is entering an electoral cycle before the partial elections in Congress on November 3, 2026.
Three Factors Simultaneously
The attention of the American administration is scattered in multiple directions at once. First, “the war in the Middle East” – the tripartite negotiations between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia have indeed failed after the start of the American military operation against Iran. Since then, this format has not been reassembled, with meetings only taking place bilaterally.
Secondly, “internal electoral logic.” The partial elections in Congress have existential significance for Trump: losing the majority in both chambers opens the way for impeachment and paralyzes presidential initiatives. As noted by analysts from the publication “Ukrainian News,” in 2026, Washington will largely view the war in Ukraine through the prism of this internal electoral calendar.
Thirdly, “the structure of the administration itself.” American foreign policy is increasingly shaped not by the State Department, but by a narrow ideological circle around Trump – loyalists, media, and major donors primarily interested in the domestic agenda.
“The Time Has Not Come Yet”
“Simply put, the motivation has not yet changed in Russia and the conditions for an agreement have not been created.” – Dmytro Kouleba, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, on negotiations in Abu Dhabi
Kouleba, speaking from the United Arab Emirates, where energy and prisoner exchange issues were raised, clearly outlined the process’ outcome: negotiations continue but do not move closer to a ceasefire. According to him, Putin examines the results of each strike and sees no reason to stop. Trump, on the other hand, publicly congratulates him.
In the President’s Office, this is stated even more concretely: “As long as the war in the Middle East continues, negotiations on Ukraine will remain paused.” Mikhaïlo Podolyak adds that Iran’s support for Russia is gradually changing attitudes towards Moscow in Arab countries – paradoxically strengthening Kyiv’s international subjectivity.
What Kyiv is Doing Instead
Tichiy, acknowledging the limited attention from the United States, does not speak of crisis – he describes a strategy of adaptation. Ukrainian diplomacy is currently focusing on:
– Bilateral contacts instead of tripartite meetings where the United States mediates; – The Geneva track – particularly sensitive points of the peace plan will be taken to the level of Presidents Zelenski and Trump; – Strengthening positions on platforms where the United States is not a central actor – notably at the United Nations, where the General Assembly approved a resolution supporting Ukraine with 107 votes.
Analysts warn that foreign policy remains the prerogative of the president, so a shift in balance in Congress post-2026 elections will likely not radically change Trump’s approach to Ukraine. The key variable is not the composition of Congress, but Moscow’s motivation and willingness to give Trump a “victory” to present to voters.
If by November 2026, Trump has nothing to show on Ukrainian direction – will this become a reason to pressure Russia, or will it force him to achieve any result for his internal popularity?
