In a world where multilateralism is giving way to dominant blocs, Thierry de Montbrial advocates for a more united and proactive Europe, capable of ensuring its security and standing against major powers, while respecting national identities. As the 17th edition of the World Policy Conference approaches this weekend in Chantilly, which he founded, the executive president of the French Institute of International Relations sheds light on the major challenges of global governance.
The way the Trump administration treats Europe, beyond security and economic aspects, adds a layer of political and moral aggression as he wants to choose our leaders. How should we respond? There are two aspects to distinguish in Trump’s foreign policy. The fact that the Atlantic Alliance no longer has the same significance as during the Cold War is, to me, evident. Russia is not the USSR. Trump brutally accentuates a trend.
The second aspect is the style. Speaking without restraint is a symptom of omnipotence, when one can say anything, insult everyone, and interfere in the internal affairs of others. Such an attitude is contagious and therefore dangerous, and I fear it may be difficult to completely reverse.
In behaving systematically in this way, Trump provides arguments to all the powers in this world that have imperial ambitions. China is responding, at least diplomatically, with much caution for now. However, the behaviors you have just described favor the trend towards fragmentation of the world into blocs, or at least into spheres of influence, each dominated by a power with a hegemonic inclination. This raises the question of a shift from multilateralism to a club of dominant powers.
“The international law has never been violated in such a systematic and arrogant manner.”
In this context, what is the future of multilateralism? Multilateralism is an organizational form based on international law, but international law has never been violated in such a systematic and arrogant manner. This leads to daunting questions. How will the UN adapt, and to what end? Can a new form of multilateralism, akin to the “concert of powers” of the past, emerge?
A new wave of arms race is underway. Territorial challenges, not only on Taiwan, are becoming commonplace. Violence intensifies in interstate relations. However, the disappearance of the UN seems very unlikely, as its continuation, even in a much less ambitious form than in 1945, remains in the interest of all states.
Trump constantly threatens to withdraw from NATO
NATO has survived so far because it is not just a military organization, but predominantly political. Historically, the European Community, now the European Union, is indissolubly linked to it. For Americans, the Euro-Atlantic institutions form a whole of which they are the leaders. This is how they saw things since the 1950s, and it was not incorrect.
“The real question is whether the European Union, without sufficient unity, would fragment in the event of NATO’s weakening or disappearance.”
Today, the European center has become secondary in their eyes. The real question is whether the European Union, without sufficient unity, would fragment in the event of NATO’s weakening or disappearance.
However, European politicians still talk about a European pillar of NATO. This European pillar has never gone beyond good intentions. As with the Draghi and Letta reports of two years ago on the European economy, the goal of European defense poses fundamental problems, for example on an industrial level.
The question of the future combat aircraft shows that strategic ambitions and industrial interests are difficult to reconcile. Germany apparently sees itself as the dominant industrial power in armaments. Poland, which also has a very acute sense of its interests, is in the process of establishing a military that may be one of the largest in Europe. These are, first and foremost, national steps.
Beyond the industrial aspect, there is a reflection on European defense at a time when the United States no longer seems to be a reliable partner. What does defending Europe mean? This is a troubling question we must ask ourselves. Does it make sense to think today as if the European Union were a whole, equivalent to a real nation? That is the fundamental question.
Either the answer is really yes, and at that moment, it means that the fate of the Spaniards, Italians, and French is indeed played out in the Baltic countries. Or, we must have the lucidity to reason explicitly in terms of building a strong classical alliance between European countries, each with their own national interests. The American risk forces us to be clear.
Wouldanalliance of middle powers provide a solution, by organizing to provide security guarantees to Ukraine or protect maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz? This may be the case, possibly in cooperation with certain countries outside of Europe. In the case of the Strait of Hormuz, France is a naval power that could contribute to security guarantees when needed. In fact, participating in volunteer coalitions could be a response element to the issue of burden-sharing with the United States.
Rather than paying a protector, one can take charge of certain aspects of common defense. But it must also rely on a strong economy. A France that continues to not address its fundamental economic and social problems head-on will eventually become unable to contribute to any alliance.
What is your prognosis for the war in Ukraine? It seems to be bogged down and could even last for years. The Russians have taken a long-term position and the Ukrainians are resisting impressively. They will eventually lack fighters, first in Ukraine. Trump is currently ignoring the issue.
It is also important to note that wars today do not declare and conclude with treaties anymore. Perhaps there will be a ceasefire, like between the two Koreas since the armistice of July 27, 1953. The Ukrainian nation has been forged or strengthened through this war and will likely have borders, but not those of 1991. This Ukraine will be part of the future organization of European security. The European Union towards which we are moving will be bordered by Belarus, Russia, and Turkey.
How do you see this European organization evolving? I am convinced that the European Union, destined to be even further enlarged, must undergo deep reform to survive. At this stage, politically, we must go all the way with the idea of enlargement, and therefore integrate Ukraine and the Balkans.
“The European model is moving away from a federation. I would rather see a confederation.”
We cannot procrastinate indefinitely. The EU has gradually changed its nature with successive enlargements to the east. This will force us to explicitly recognize that the European model is moving away from a federation. I would rather see a confederation.
What would this confederation look like in your opinion? I conceive the concept of confederation as an association of states with strong economic and security cooperation, without questioning national identities. This envisaged confederation implies the notion of an alliance. States must be given freedom to find comfort in their national aspirations while wanting to build a true alliance with their partners. An alliance that goes beyond Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty on mutual assistance between states.
I could very well imagine a rethought alliance like NATO. It could be called, for example, “the European Alliance Treaty Organization.” Besides defense, we could strengthen coherence in terms of industrial cooperation, armaments, etc. Such an alliance would not be incompatible with coalitions of volunteers including external elements.
We could also give more substance to the European political community of Emmanuel Macron. The idea of a variable geometry Europe is not new; it was already widely discussed in the 1990s.
