Under international law of the sea, sovereignty over a land formation, even a tiny one, projects significant maritime rights: a territorial sea, up to 12 nautical miles or 22 km, and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), up to 200 nautical miles or 370 km.
For Matthew and Hunter, this means that sovereignty opens access to hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of fishing rights, maritime policing, and scientific research. The land/sea ratio is staggering.
These two small islets have been a subject of dispute between France and Vanuatu for years. In an interview with the Vanuatu daily “Daily Post,” Christian Tein, the president of the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), the main independence movement in New Caledonia, recently reiterated that his organization “has always maintained its position that Matthew and Hunter belong to the people of Vanuatu.” He goes further by stating that the territorial dispute between the two countries would be “easier” to resolve if New Caledonia were to grant independence.
In fact, the two islets are the subject of a sovereignty conflict between France and Vanuatu, with origins dating back. In 1929, France formally annexed Matthew and Hunter and linked them to New Caledonia. In 1965, the United Kingdom claimed them as part of the New Hebrides. In 1980, the New Hebrides became independent as Vanuatu and resumed the claim… in 2025, Paris and Port-Vila began formal negotiations on sovereignty and maritime demarcation.
Concretely, Vanuatu heavily relies on revenues from fishing licenses issued to foreign vessels. Including Matthew and Hunter in its EEZ would mean: expanding its maritime economic perimeter, increasing royalty revenues, and strengthening control over fishery resources.
For France and New Caledonia, sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter would maintain a strategic presence in the Pacific, preserve access to marine resources, and ensure regional maritime governance coherence.
The uncertainty over sovereignty creates a gray area in the region. Consequences include ambiguous fishing authorizations and complicated maritime controls. Not to mention, opportunistic actors, particularly Chinese vessels, exploit the legal ambiguity.
In New Caledonia, this issue reveals a local political divide. While independence supporters recognize Vanuatu’s sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter, non-independence supporters back French sovereignty.
This division reflects broader tensions regarding the institutional future of New Caledonia.
Matthew and Hunter are not isolated cases. In the Indian Ocean, the Scattered Islands (5 small islets under French sovereignty) are claimed by Madagascar. A precedent regarding negotiation or cession on Matthew and Hunter could encourage Madagascar to demand the same treatment. It could also initiate a revision dynamic of French micro-territories and open up other post-colonial disputes.
Other examples exist, such as the Southern Kuril Islands (Russia-Japan dispute) or the Senkaku Islands (Japan-China-Taiwan conflict).
When possible arrangements are found, they do not “settle” history, but make the sea governable.
Matthew and Hunter embody this in that they represent a modern geopolitical paradox: two uninhabited rocks redefining access to resources, regional diplomacy, and the position of a territory in its neighborhood.
Their resolution is not just a technical question of maritime law – it is a test of the states’ ability to navigate between legal logic, diplomatic logic, and post-colonial heritage.






