The Stakes of the 11th Review Conference of the NPT. A Regime Weakened by Strategic Competition.

The failure of nuclear disarmament

For a decade, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has been increasing, reversing the trend since the end of the Cold War. China has gone from about 250 nuclear warheads in 2020 to over 600 in 2026. Russia and the United States, formerly bound by the New START Treaty, which expired in February 2026, could also increase their arsenals in the medium term, while the United Kingdom had announced since 2021 the decision to raise its threshold to 260 warheads. Similarly, France has chosen to increase its stock, citing progress in adversary missile defense, while deciding not to disclose its size, estimated at about 290 warheads in 2026.

States possessing nuclear weapons (NWS) reiterated in their preparatory documents to the RevCon their goal of verifiable nuclear disarmament, on the condition that their own security is not affected, seeking to remain in line with the spirit of Article VI of the NPT, which commits the NWS to “good faith disarmament”. Likewise, in his speech on March 2, 2026, the French president recalled that the increase in the French nuclear arsenal was not an arms race and that it would remain strictly sized. It is not certain that the argument will be heard by some non-nuclear states (NNWS), many of whom are critical of this disrespect for the Treaty by the NWS, and more broadly the “irresponsible” behavior of these states.

An increased risk of nuclear proliferation

Although no NNWS has acquired a nuclear weapon since North Korea in 2003, the international context seems favorable to proliferation. Thus, despite several negotiation cycles since the 2022 RevCon, no agreement has been reached to date to constrain the Iranian nuclear program. The two wars waged by the United States and Israel in June 2025 and in spring 2026 in the face of the deadlock in the discussions, could ultimately have a counterproductive effect. In addition to the total loss of visibility on the Iranian program and the assumed rupture between the United States and Iran, urgent nuclear security questions arise, such as the IAEA’s access to bombed sites and the future of fissile material produced by Tehran in recent years.

The new challenges of civilian nuclear energy

The third pillar of the NPT, which allows NNWS to have facilitated access to civilian nuclear energy, faces numerous challenges. Already on the agenda of the 2022 RevCon because of the AUKUS agreement (Australia, UK, and US), the sharing of nuclear propulsion technology from NWS to NNWS could make a comeback due to the agreement, the terms of which are currently unclear, signed between the US and South Korea, aiming to help Seoul build nuclear-propelled submarines.

The search for a common denominator

This review conference is therefore expected to be extremely politicized, especially among the NWS, whose P5 format (France, China, US, UK, and Russia) is supposed to be the driver of the NPT. The reduction of strategic risks, once a point of convergence between NWS, is threatened by strategic competition. Some NGO objectives for this RevCon, such as the adoption of a declaration by the NWS on the refusal to integrate artificial intelligence into nuclear weapons command and control systems, or discussions on arsenal fail-safe protocols, are unlikely to succeed due to the strong tensions between NWS. Even the reiteration of a joint declaration on the refusal of nuclear war, as in January 2022, seems unattainable.