Invoking the “Thucydides Trap” in face of Donald Trump, Xi Jinping brought back to the forefront an old geopolitical theory: the risk of a dominant power going to war with an emerging power. But the history of Athens and Sparta is much more complex than this formula suggests.
During their high-stakes meeting this week in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly questioned American President Donald Trump about the ability of the two powers to avoid the “Thucydides Trap.”
Popularized in the early 2010s by American political scientist Graham Allison, this expression refers to the risk of war that can emerge when a dominant power sees the rise of influence of a rival power. Allison specifically had China and the United States in mind.
L’image tire son nom de Thucydide, auteur de Histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse, consacrée à la guerre de 27 ans entre Athènes et Sparte commencée en 431 avant notre ère.
An Error in Managing Power Relations
The idea behind the “Thucydides Trap” implies that a dominant power struggles to handle the ascent of a rival power and eventually views war as inevitable, even though it might not be the only possible outcome.
This notion is based on a quote from “The History of the Peloponnesian War” (Book I, Chapter 23), in which Thucydides wrote:
“I began to write the causes of this breach and the differences that led to it, so that one day it would not be asked where such a war came from. The real cause, though not openly stated, in my opinion, was the power to which the Athenians had risen and the fear they instilled in the Lacedaemonians (Sparta) which forced them into war.”
Translated to contemporary times, the general idea of the “Thucydides Trap” suggests that the United States, concerned about China’s rise in power, might be tempted by a logic of confrontation even though alternative options exist. However, many ancient Greece specialists now challenge this modern use of the concept.
A Contested Concept
The term “trap” implies that Sparta made a mistake in 431 BCE and could have managed Athens’ rise to power differently. However, that’s not exactly what Thucydides tells.
On the contrary, he shows that Sparta had good reasons to fear Athenian ascendancy. Athens had become the primary naval power in the Balkans and the Aegean Sea. It attracted Sparta’s allies one by one and was not hesitant to crush those who refused to switch sides.
These allies basically issued an ultimatum to Sparta in 432 BCE: act against Athens, or they would join Athens’ camp. It was this pressure from its own allies that led Sparta to intervene against Athens.
Yes, in a way, the growing fear of Athenian power did ultimately lead Sparta to war. The Spartans felt compelled to engage in total war against Athens to preserve their system of alliances, and in 431 BCE, they broke the peace treaty with the Athenian city-state.
A Long-Term Perspective
More broadly, the “Thucydides Trap” also highlights that in the long term, the situation did not favor Sparta. While it eventually won the Peloponnesian War, it came after 27 years of conflict.
After its victory, Sparta embarked on a broad expansion to become an even more dominant power. This rise in power then raised concerns among the rest of the Greek world.
By 404 BCE, Sparta’s expansion gradually turned many of its allies into adversaries. These Greek city-states eventually united against Sparta, leading to Sparta’s total defeat in 371 BCE at the Battle of Leuctra. Sparta lost its allies, freed its slaves, and was reduced to a secondary power.
A Lesson for Today
The history of the Peloponnesian War offers several insights for current relations between China and the United States. One is that it can be dangerous for an established power to try to contain the rise of an emerging power. Sparta learned at its own expense that such a strategy could have considerable costs. By accepting more of Athens’ rise to power, Sparta might have preserved its great power status well into the 4th century BCE.
Another lesson is that a dominant power, like the United States today, can choose to reduce its ambitions and focus more on regions closer to its immediate interests.
This is precisely what democratic Athens did after the Peloponnesian War. This refocusing allowed Athens to continue to thrive culturally and politically while keeping its enemies at bay until the 310s BCE.
