A simple question, an embarrassing answer
Can we really build a European defense that is independent of the United States, when the main countries involved do not have the same definition of the word “autonomy”? At the Senate, a hearing on February 12, 2026, brought this tension to the center of the debate.
On that day, the Committee on European Affairs heard from two experts from Germany and Poland: Jacob Ross, from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, and Melchior Szczepanik, from the Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych. The Senate wanted to shed light on major European issues. It mainly revealed a much less comfortable political reality for Paris.
What Berlin and Warsaw think
The core message is clear: for Warsaw, the main ally remains Washington. Melchior Szczepanik said this directly to the senators. From the Polish point of view, American nuclear deterrence remains the pillar of national security.
From the German side, Jacob Ross highlighted another decisive point: Germany has rebuilt its position in Europe through collective frameworks, from the UN to NATO and then to the European Union. He also emphasized that, in practice, a large part of the German elites still refer to the United States as soon as a strategic decision becomes difficult.
His most telling example concerns counterterrorism intelligence. According to him, nearly 90% of the information used by German internal security to prevent attacks comes from American services, especially the NSA. It is this type of dependence that, in his eyes, makes any transatlantic rupture politically and technically risky.
Why this fracture line matters
In France, the debate on “strategic autonomy” is often characterized by a voluntarist tone. French diplomacy has been advocating for a stronger European defense for years, and the EU’s Strategic Compass, endorsed in 2022, aims to strengthen the security and defense capabilities of the Twenty-Seven. However, there is a gap between the stated objective and the reality of the allies.
France’s partners do not all see the same need to push the idea of autonomous European defense further. Germany remains tied to the transatlantic architecture, and Berlin is discussing options with Paris, but without wanting to break away from the American umbrella. In January 2026, Friedrich Merz mentioned discussions about a “shared nuclear umbrella” with European allies, clarifying that nothing had been decided and that these exchanges did not contradict shared deterrence within NATO.
The crux of the problem: money, doctrine, and trust
The debate is not just ideological. It is also budgetary and operational. Reuters noted at the end of February 2026 that France spends around 5.6 billion euros per year on maintaining its nuclear deterrence force, consisting of about 290 nuclear weapons. In other words, even the EU’s leading nuclear power does not have an infinitely extensible lever to protect its neighbors alone.
There is also a question of command. Who decides? Who pays? Who controls the usage? This is where the reluctance arises. European officials interviewed by Reuters still believed, at the end of February, that an expansion of the French role would immediately raise issues of cost-sharing, political control, and prioritization given to conventional forces, those that fight before nuclear ones.
On the contrary, Paris insists on a simple principle: French deterrence remains national, therefore under the exclusive control of the President of the Republic. This is the foundation of its credibility. France wants to make clear what it can offer to Europeans, without promising a fusion of decision-making chains. This stance explains why the idea of sharing the bomb generates as much expectation as distrust.
What the hearing reveals
This hearing does not suggest that a European defense is impossible. It indicates something more precise: Europeans do not start from the same point, nor do they have the same priorities. For France, strengthening Europe must also strengthen its political autonomy. For Germany and Poland, the immediate priority is to maintain a credible American anchor, especially in the face of Russia and uncertainties about Washington’s commitment.
In practice, the benefits are not the same for all countries. Eastern states gain a quick guarantee by staying under the American umbrella. Germany gains time by avoiding too abrupt a strategic shift. France, on the other hand, bears the political cost of a project it would like to be European, but which its partners only partially accept.
Criticism also exists. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, warned in February that the emergence of new discussions on nuclear issues mainly reflects the concern about a less stable transatlantic alliance. However, she also reminded that increasing nuclear weapons is not inherently a response to the European security crisis.
In short, the contradiction remains intact: the more Europe doubts American protection, the more it talks about autonomy; but the more it talks about autonomy, the more it reveals that it does not agree on what that means. The Senate hearings have not closed the debate. They have simply diagnosed that European defense is advancing, but not at the same pace or in the same direction among its main actors.
What to watch
The sequence to follow is now as much political as it is strategic. In France, the forthcoming statements on nuclear doctrine and the role of European partners will indicate how far Paris wants to go. In Germany, the real test will be the ability to translate discussions on nuclear and conventional cooperation into concrete decisions. In Poland, it remains to be seen if the priority given to Washington remains intact or if the European debate gains ground.
Therefore, the issue is far from abstract. Behind the words of sovereignty, deterrence, and autonomy, there is a very concrete question: who protects whom, with what means, and at what political cost. This is where the real European fracture line is now at stake.
