Water, a common good for humanity, lies at the heart of geopolitical and strategic rivalries in the Middle East. This region, already marked by armed conflicts and political reshuffling, makes water a central issue of power and vulnerability for states. Particularly exposed to water stress, they face several aggravating factors such as climate change, population growth, and degradation of hydraulic infrastructure. These dynamics increase tensions and make water management an economic, social, and security challenge.
However, geopolitical studies of water emphasize that there are rarely actual “water wars” in the strict sense. Water often acts as a risk multiplier in latent conflicts. This perspective is supported by analyses from the Economic Intelligence Portal on Central Asia, where access to water is described as a major power vector. This access can fuel interstate or local tensions, although it is not the sole cause.
In this context, Egypt and Israel present contrasting trajectories. Egypt depends almost entirely on a transboundary river, the Nile, and its water security is threatened by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Israel, long faced with chronic water scarcity, has turned water into a technological and geopolitical asset through desalination and wastewater reuse, while also using this resource in the conflict with Palestinians. In both cases, water is now integrated into national security and is at the core of political discourse and structural decisions.
Egypt: Existential Dependence on a Nile Under Strain
Structural Vulnerabilities and Growing Water Stress
Egypt relies on the Nile for over 90% to 98% of its freshwater resources. This dependence is often highlighted by Egyptian officials who describe it as a matter of national survival. Studies on the country’s water resource management indicate an alarming crisis, pointing out the insufficient water availability per capita, pollution of irrigation canals, and delays in modernizing drinking water and sanitation networks.
These vulnerabilities are compounded by several structural dynamics. Population growth places the country below the thresholds of water availability per capita commonly associated with water security. Additionally, climate change is expected to reduce precipitation in the Nile Basin and increase hydrological variability, worsening the risks of prolonged droughts. This is further exacerbated by the progressive salinization of the delta and degradation of agricultural soils, amplified by the potential decrease in flow rates and intensive agricultural practices.
The economic and social consequences of these tensions are already visible. A study on food subsidies highlights that the completion of the GERD, the war in Ukraine, and the decline in revenues from the Suez Canal constitute a major external shock. This contributes to weakening both the country’s food security and its Egyptian budget balances. Thus, even a moderate reduction in Nile inflows would further strain public finances and increase dependence on imports, risking fueling social unrest.
Conclusion
In the short term, the likelihood of a major armed conflict triggered solely by water remains unlikely, both in Egypt and Israel. However, the risks of destabilization linked to water resources are real. In the Egyptian case, the risk lies in the ability to establish a sustainable cooperation framework on the Nile and deeply modernize internal water management. The goal will be to reduce the structural vulnerability of the economy and society. In the Israeli case, the question revolves more around its uses in the conflict with Palestinians and in regional relations. These practices can sustain long-term conflict, with a strong political and humanitarian dimension.
Further analyses from the Economic Intelligence Portal on other regions show that water tensions often arise from a mix of ecological stress, population growth, and political rivalries. These factors contribute to complex crises. In the Middle East, several de-escalation mechanisms exist. Desalination is expanding, as are water-energy exchange agreements and some forms of water diplomacy. However, these solutions are not sufficient without addressing access inequalities and perceptions of injustice in both Egypt and Israel.
Clémence BRODIN and Adrien RAMEL
