Published on May 18, 2026 at 22:31
Forty years of contrasting relations between France and Germany: how did we go from hand in hand with François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl to a more tense relationship today between Paris and Berlin? The contentious issues are piling up: on defense, arms sales, free trade agreements, and also on our debt.
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François Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl, hand in hand in Verdun. The image, symbol of a united Franco-German couple, went around the world. But how, forty years later, did this duo turn into a duel between Chancellor Merz and President Macron? How to explain the current crisis between our two countries?
The latest point of contention: the free trade agreement signed between the European Union and the countries of Latin America in Mercosur. Paris is against it, Berlin is for it. The differences are clear. “I will never defend an agreement that is lax in what we import and tough in what we produce here,” declares Emmanuel Macron on February 27. “Germany and France did not vote together. I deeply regret that,” shares Friedrich Merz on May 7.
Another point of tension: support for Ukraine. After four years of war, the European Union unblocks 90 billion euros. But France and Germany disagree on how to finance it. A standoff lost by the Germans. “Germany hoped to be able to mobilize the frozen Russian assets to finance military support for Ukraine. For France, this was not conceivable. This significantly harmed the relationship between France and Germany,” observes Paul Maurice, a specialist on Germany, researcher at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI).
Strategic disagreements against a backdrop of industrial competition between the two sides of the Rhine. The most striking example: the SCAF, the future combat aircraft to replace the Rafale. Launched with great fanfare in 2017, it may never see the light of day. The difficult agreement between the companies responsible for piloting it is the cause: Airbus for Germany and Dassault for France. “If Airbus maintains its position of not wanting to work with Dassault, the issue is dead,” assures Éric Trappier, CEO of Dassault Aviation.
Despite the tensions, Berlin assures that this 100 billion euro project is not yet buried. Close to Chancellor Scholz, a member of parliament is convinced. “Both parties have invested a lot in this project. Skills have been developed. It’s not wasted money, but time,” says Thomas Röwekamp, CDU deputy, president of the defense parliamentary committee.
Beyond the accumulating issues, a dark spot remains: France’s debt. “The Germans, who are inspired by a spirit of seriousness, who have the famous budgetary golden rule, consider us irresponsible. Unfortunately, we are seen by the European system, with Germany at the head, as a risky country now, a risky country,” indicates Hubert Védrine, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Reviving the Franco-German engine, a challenging task for a French president nearing the end of his term and a German chancellor leading a fragile coalition.
