Why the EU severed ties with Russia – and at what cost
To fully understand Laschet’s criticism, one must consider the historical context. Following the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the EU largely froze its diplomatic contacts with Russia. This decision was morally justifiable and politically coherent: the EU did not want to legitimize an aggressor through normal diplomatic relations. However, it had a high strategic cost: Europe effectively removed itself from the conflict.
While Europe severed its relations with Moscow, the United States, under the Trump presidency, was developing a new framework for direct negotiation. Special envoys, such as real estate developer Steve Witkoff – close to Trump – became key players in Ukrainian diplomacy. European leaders collaborated with Zelensky to formulate positions jointly, which were then relayed to Moscow by these American negotiators. This system worked like a game of telephone: a European position formulated in Kyiv could arrive in Moscow distorted or weakened. Europe’s influence on the content and direction of the negotiations was structurally limited.
The EU itself tried to regain its influence. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, declared in February 2026 that if the United States did not demand concessions from the Russians, it was up to the Europeans to do so; Moscow and Washington needed to understand that Europeans were essential to lasting peace.
The investigation results: What citizens want and what they experience
The identified deficiencies now have a significant impact on public perception. A representative survey conducted by infratest dimap for the Charlemagne Prize Foundation revealed a striking discrepancy. While in 2024, 72% of Germans were convinced that the EU provided protection and stability in times of uncertainty, this figure dropped to only 48% in 2026. The decline was particularly pronounced in East Germany: only 38% of East Germans viewed the EU as a protective factor, compared to 50% in West Germany.
At the same time, the desire for a strong Europe remains intact: 82% of Germans believe that Germany needs a strong European Union to face major powers like Russia, China, and the United States. Laschet commented on this contradiction, stating that citizens want a strong European Union but apparently do not feel its effects sufficiently in daily life and in times of crisis.
Mario Draghi’s alarm call: Economic strength as the basis for any other power
In this context, Mario Draghi’s selection as the 2026 Charlemagne Prize laureate was not coincidental. The Charlemagne Prize committee deliberately sent a signal, as Laschet explained: this distinction meant to the Commission that the pace of the European Union was not in line with the world in which Europe needed to evolve. In 2024, Draghi published a monumental report on European competitiveness, considered a wake-up call and a concrete roadmap for reforms. The diagnosis was clear: Europe is lagging behind in many areas, especially compared to the United States and China; its weaknesses are worsening.
Merz and the call for a Europe as a power
During the Charlemagne Prize ceremony, Chancellor Friedrich Merz presented a coherent vision aligning economic and security demands. “Europe aspires to become a power capable of withstanding the storms of this new era,” he declared in Aix-la-Chapelle. He advocated for a deep modernization of the EU budget, focused on military and economic power, a streamlined structure, and investments in competitiveness and defense.
Merz thus operated a paradigm shift in German European policy: from an approach where Germany had to be as reserved as possible and maintain European unity through financial redistribution to a position where it confidently defined European interests and mobilized the necessary resources to defend them.
What structurally lacks in Europe’s foreign policy
An honest diagnosis must highlight institutional shortcomings. Within the EU, responsibilities for foreign policy are divided among various institutions: the European External Action Service (EEAS), the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Council, the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union. This fragmentation leads to a lack of clarity in defining responsibilities, interinstitutional rivalries, and inconsistent external communication. This is why Wadephul advocated for consolidating foreign policy responsibilities in Brussels.
Another structural problem lies in the EU’s tendency to react rather than anticipate crises. After the 2022 invasion, the EU broke all communication channels with Russia without developing an alternative diplomatic strategy. It reacted to the 28-point plan of the United States and Russia instead of defining its own framework.
The crucial question: Is Laschet’s criticism justified?
Laschet’s diagnosis is generally accurate but deserves some nuance. It would be unfair to deprive the EU of all diplomatic initiatives. The Commission imposed 20 rounds of sanctions against Russia, which, considering the unanimity principle and the pro-Russian stance of some member states, is a considerable political achievement.
Where Laschet’s criticism is relevant is the issue of direct diplomacy with Russia. The decision to cut all communication channels with Moscow may have been morally coherent, but it proved strategically shortsighted. Without direct communication channels, the EU cannot present its positions directly, send signals, or explore maneuvering space. It constantly depends on intermediaries, be they the United States or other third countries. This is not sovereign foreign policy but rather dependency on adherence to principles.
The political scientist Johannes Varwick also put forward a challenging counter-argument: European involvement in Ukrainian diplomacy might actually prolong the war instead of shorten it. This opinion, while unpopular, is significant. It underscores that Europe’s problem lies not only in a lack of assertiveness but also in a lack of clarity regarding its true aspirations and the compromises it is willing to make.
Three ways to overcome self-exclusion
The analysis reveals three complementary reform paths that must be pursued cumulatively, not alternatively.
The first path involves institutional reform: abandoning the unanimity principle in foreign and security policy in favor of qualified majorities, consolidating foreign policy responsibilities, and strengthening the European External Action Service to make it an effective entity. This reform is urgent but politically the most challenging to implement as it requires unanimity to abolish unanimity.
The second path is that of differentiated integration: a core of voluntary states advances on foreign and security policy issues without being hindered by obstructive members. This pragmatic approach relies on existing conventional frameworks but carries the risk of permanently dividing the EU into inner and outer circles.
The third path is that of economic strengthening: completing the single market, deepening capital market union, reducing national subsidies, joint armament acquisitions, and securing supply chains for strategic raw materials. This path is the most ambitious but also, in a way, the most fundamental: without economic power, European foreign policy remains a mere gesture. Draghi’s report offers the most detailed and convincing plan for this.
Laschet’s term “self-valorization” may be most apt in the current European debate. It highlights that Europe’s weak foreign policy is not a result of chance or hostile external powers but of its own decisions, structures, and omissions. Europe has self-devalued – through institutional blockages, diplomatic channel ruptures, and a prioritization of moralization over negotiation. The good news: what is self-inflicted can also be repaired. The bad news: time is of the essence.
