While the clashes between Russian influencers and state television propagandists are grabbing public attention [following Viktoria Bonya, several Russian Internet personalities have recently criticized the country’s situation], Kremlin politicians are facing another problem: growing political unrest among those close to power, from businessmen to generals. The usual response is to invoke the myth of the “good tsar,” betrayed and misinformed by his collaborators, but with Vladimir Putin’s declining popularity, it is increasingly difficult to maintain this narrative and counter open criticism.
Expat influencer Viktoria Bonya addressed [on April 14th] a video to Putin, viewed by tens of millions of Russians, in which she listed the country’s problems. In return, she faced harsh attacks from television host Vladimir Soloviev [one of the most famous faces of state television, known for his outspoken views], under sanctions for his support of the war in Ukraine.
Soloviev launched a particularly venomous diatribe against Bonya, calling her a “prostitute” who should be investigated and refrain from “saturating the information space.” She retaliated by releasing a video, generated by AI, of herself as Spider-Woman, facing off against some of her detractors.
However, the most striking aspect is that, despite denouncing government failures, the influencer avoids directly implicating Vladimir Putin. She warns him, “the people are afraid of you, artists are afraid, governors are afraid,” but implies that he was not properly informed about the situation in the country. “There is a huge wall between you and us, ordinary people.”
Cautious Criticism
Out of conviction or caution, Viktoria Bonya brings to life a political myth as old as Russia itself, that the nation’s woes are not the fault of the “good tsar” — who, after all, was chosen by God — but rather the “bad boyars” (the aristocrats and ministers) who misadvise or obstruct him.
Putin has long tried to leverage this narrative. At the beginning of his rule, he would often rush to disaster or industrial dispute sites to publicly reprimand the local governor or bosses. He never embodied the problem, but the solution, the message.
He is now older and worn. Since Covid, his travels across the country have drastically decreased. Nevertheless, he continues to absolve himself of embarrassing problems and failures. During a government meeting he chaired [on April 15th], for example, he railed against the lack of economic growth — estimated at around 1% this year — and demanded measures to address it. He never admitted for a second that the main cause was anything other than the war (and subsequent sanctions) that he alone chose to launch.
After twenty-six years of direct and indirect rule by Putin over the country, the myth of the “good tsar” is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. It has rather become a way to express criticisms cautiously, without taking too many risks.
An industrialist [recently] interviewed by a nationalist media lamented the “existential crisis” hitting his industry but hedged his comments by adding, “I don’t know if the government knows the truth” and questioning “who informs the high-ranking officials.”
Similarly, pro-Kremlin war correspondent Andrei Filatov warned that “casualties are either completely hidden or drip-fed, creating an impression at the top of the state that the situation is not so serious. Consequently, the army does not adapt.”
Record Low Popularity Rates
There is a serious problem of concealment and falsification within the Russian government, as well as in its military hierarchy. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, tends to announce victories in advance. On Tuesday [April 21st], for example, he proclaimed the “total liberation” of the contested region of Luhansk, for the fifth time.
However, a portion of the Russian population genuinely believes that Putin is oblivious to the country’s situation. At best, it is assumed that if he is misinformed, it is because he prefers not to hear bad news.
This has resulted in a gradual decline in Putin’s approval ratings. Even the national VTsIOM institute reported a six-week decline in his popularity, reaching 66.7%. While this figure may seem high to Western eyes, compared to genuinely multi-party systems, the comparison does not hold. This rate is at its lowest level since 2022, and the President’s party, United Russia, polls at only 27.3%.
None of this can be used to predict the imminent end of Putin’s rule. There is no organized opposition worthy of the name, his control of the security apparatus remains unchallenged, and even in the midst of a war, his detractors refuse to destabilize the country. This situation rather demonstrates the difficulty and increasing efforts required to maintain the status quo. It also tells us that one of Putin’s greatest assets, his personal authority, is declining.
