Drone Wars: The Low

United States: Drone Warfare Adapting to New Global Realities

The United States, pioneers in drone warfare, are seeing their lead challenged by the rise of cheap drones produced en masse. The ongoing “saturation warfare” in Iran is changing the balance of power: the number and adaptability of drones are becoming as important as possessing highly advanced and expensive technological systems. Washington is facing a strategic setback more than a technological one, struggling to adapt its military model.

The United States has long been at the forefront of drone warfare. Starting in the 2000s with Predators and Reapers, Washington established a doctrine based on constant surveillance and targeted remote strikes, notably in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. These operations sparked intense debates on their legality, effectiveness, and political consequences. The approach was based on a central promise: striking remotely with precision while minimizing exposure of American forces.

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East mark a paradigm shift. This historical advantage no longer protects Washington. A new generation of threats is emerging, simpler, more accessible, and significantly less costly. From Iranian drones like Shahed, widely used by Russia, to naval drones improvised in the Black Sea, and FPV drones (First Person View, also known as kamikaze drones) transformed into low-cost precision weapons, drone warfare has democratized, undermining the foundations of American superiority.

The End of a Technological Model

Drone warfare is no longer just about precision but also about saturation. Mass-produced drones, sometimes rudimentary, are now overwhelming sophisticated systems by leveraging numbers, repetition, and defenses saturation, as seen in Ukraine with the Russian used Shahed drones, and also in the Middle East, where these same systems, directly employed by Iran or through its proxies, have targeted Israel or Gulf infrastructures.

The cost of attacks has plummeted. A Shahed drone is estimated between $20,000 and $50,000, while some FPV drones cost only a few hundred euros. In contrast, the cost of defense remains extremely high. Intercepting these threats mobilizes advanced systems like Patriot batteries, where each missile can cost between $3 and $5 million, or fighter jets with hourly costs in the tens of thousands of dollars. Destroying a drone costing tens of thousands with a missile costing millions raises a sustainability issue in the long run.

Advanced technologies still embody real superiority but rely on engagement costs incomparable to those drones they aim to counteract. Military power no longer rests solely on qualitative superiority, but also on the capacity to produce, deploy, and quickly replace numerous, low-cost, and adaptable systems.

This shift challenges a budgetary model. Despite a defense budget of over $1.1 trillion in the United States and recent demand related to the Iran war that is expected to increase it by an additional $200 billion, the accumulation logic of sophisticated capacities clashes with a new reality. In certain contexts, quantity, resilience, and adaptability take precedence over sophistication, a logic that was long relevant against state adversaries or in conventional conflicts but is less so against diffuse, mobile, and inexpensive threats.

This evolution also affects production and adaptation dynamics: while traditional systems require years of development, drones can be designed, modified, and deployed in a matter of weeks. This is particularly evident in strategic spaces like the Gulf, even against non-state or hybrid actors. Since the “tanker wars” of the 1980s, control of the Strait of Hormuz relied on naval presence and deterrence. The proliferation of drones, both aerial and naval, disrupts this balance, allowing more cost-effective threats to critical infrastructure, vessels, and strategic passages.

An Asymmetric, Diffuse, and Transnational Warfare

This transformation also benefits non-state actors. Groups supported by Iran – from Hezbollah to the Houthis – have gradually integrated these technologies, using them against Israeli targets, neighboring countries, or Western interests in the region. The access to cheap drones allows them to bypass traditional military asymmetries and project a credible threat from a distance.

In Iraq, Western bases and diplomatic representations have become recurrent targets. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad, located in the Green Zone and protected by multiple layers of anti-air defenses, is subjected to regular attacks. This shift results in concrete human losses. On March 1, 2026, six American soldiers were killed in a drone attack against an operational center in Kuwait. A few days later, French warrant officer Arnaud Frion was also killed in a similar strike in Iraq. These attacks reveal a new reality – a diffuse, persistent, and adaptable threat embedded in low-cost harassment strategies that utilize saturation and plausible deniability.

Ukraine has served as an open-air laboratory for this transformation. Since 2022, the Ukrainian battlefield has witnessed the rise of cheap drones, especially FPVs, heavily used on the frontlines. It has also seen the extensive use of Shahed drones, designed in Iran, employed by Russia and progressively upgraded in the field. These lessons learned have been reinjected towards Iran, notably through technology transfers, data, and operational know-hows. This interaction between war theaters is now central: what is tested in Ukraine is reused, adapted, and amplified elsewhere. By 2025, Ukrainian officials offered their anti-drone expertise to the United States. Initially dismissed, this offer is now back under consideration as Washington gradually understands the shift.

American lag is not technological but structural. The U.S. continues to respond to mass warfare with precision solutions and a cost logic with an investment mindset.

This discrepancy also stems from a form of strategic blindness. Convinced of the superiority of their model, they struggle to fully integrate ongoing transformations, as evidenced by their initial reluctance to draw lessons from the Ukrainian experience. In many respects, this situation echoes the challenges faced in asymmetric warfare.

Drone warfare reverses these equilibria. It rewards less sophistication than the ability to produce, saturate, and adapt. This is not the end of American power but the end of the model on which it rested.

A Strategic Delay

The United States is not technologically surpassed but strategically behind. They continue to address mass warfare with precision solutions and a cost logic with an investment approach.

This change also points to a larger strategy, particularly on the Iranian side. Faced with limitations in conventional capabilities, Tehran has invested in asymmetric warfare based on dispersion, proxies, and extensive use of drones. Their disruptive power now largely relies on these systems.

Author: Elizabeth Sheppard Sellam – Program Manager “Policies and International Relations,” School of Foreign Languages, University of Tours

This article is from the website The Conversation.