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War in Iran: How long can the Iranian regime hold on?

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Despite the elimination of its top leaders, the Islamic Republic of Iran is banking on a long conflict. The “twelve-day war” of 2025 is now a distant memory. Over two weeks since the launch of operations Fureur épique and Lion rugissant against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States and Israel continue methodically bombing Iranian military installations.

On Tuesday, Israeli Defense Minister Israël Katz announced the “elimination” of Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council and one of the highest-ranking Iranian officials still alive, as well as the death of General Gholamreza Soleimani, who commanded the pro-regime Basij militia. According to the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) based in the United States, over 1,825 people have been killed since the start of the conflict.

“We are ahead of schedule in striking Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, whether it be storage centers, production facilities, or fixed and mobile launchers,” said Joshua Zarka, Israeli ambassador to France. “We will soon achieve our war goals, but Iran still has long-range missile stocks and about a quarter of launchers.”

According to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, more than 15,000 enemy targets have been hit by the joint action of the American and Israeli air forces, averaging over 1,000 targets per day, while Iranian missile and drone firings have decreased significantly. “Their missile volume has dropped by 90%. Their one-way attack drones plummeted by 95%,” praised the head of the new Department of War on Friday, March 13. “The United States of America has defeated and annihilated Iran, both militarily and economically, as well as in all other respects,” boasted Donald Trump on his Truth Social network, claiming that Iran wanted to “conclude an agreement.”

However, far from capitulating, Iran still refuses to negotiate with the “Great Satan” American and continues relentless missile and drone strikes against Israel and Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, causing 14 Israeli deaths and 27 casualties in the Arabian Peninsula.

“Despite a weakened ballistic and anti-aircraft defense capacity, Iran remains capable of raining down a heavy fire of missiles and drones on Israel, Gulf countries, and beyond, even if it does not inflict comparable direct damage due to the high effectiveness of the targeted countries’ anti-aircraft defense and very high interception rate,” noted a Western diplomatic source speaking on condition of anonymity.

Incapable of competing with the United States and Israel militarily, Iran has adopted an asymmetrical strategy since the beginning of the conflict against its enemies, aiming to impose a long-term cost on the allies of the United States in the region and pressure them to push Donald Trump to accept a ceasefire.

“We have a very high deterrence capacity: in terms of controlling the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, missiles, and drones, of which we are the largest producers,” emphasized Hossein Kanani Moghaddam, former high commander of the Revolutionary Guards. “When we launch a $20,000 drone at an American ship, it has no choice but to fire three Thaad missiles, each costing two million dollars.”

At the head of the Green Party, a conservative political party, Hossein Kanani Moghaddam believes that Iran has long prepared for this war of attrition against adversaries who do not fully understand the region’s intricacies. “The Americans thought they could control the military situation through maximum external pressure and force Iran to surrender at the negotiation table. However, that did not happen,” celebrated the former high-ranking Iranian officer.

“They thought that by striking the leader of the revolution and high commanders, the country’s military structure would collapse, allowing them to easily expand their military operations,” he continued. “They did not imagine that we would attack, on such a scale, bases in neighboring countries where Americans are present, or that we would close the Strait of Hormuz.”

The superficial confidence displayed in Tehran responds to the vagueness of Donald Trump’s objectives. Since the start of the conflict, the American president has struggled to define a clear goal for his military campaign, wavering between a promise of soon ending operations and an announcement of intensified bombings. “The main question now is the positioning of the United States, where this war is not popular,” pointed out a Western diplomatic source. “The economic consequences of the conflict must also be considered, with a surge in oil prices.”

In Israel, the goal of regime change appears to be more explicit. “After reducing the regime’s nuclear and ballistic capabilities, we are now entering the second phase of the conflict aimed at weakening the regime to allow the Iranian population to take control of the country,” said Joshua Zarka. “By targeting Revolutionary Guards bases, as well as Basij militia bases, we have affected the regime’s ability to control the Iranian people. We are pushing the regime to the tipping point, and everything will depend on the population’s ability to take to the streets.”

For now, caught between American-Israeli bombings and the regime’s threats to crush any pro-enemy dissent, Iranians remain trapped at home. And no major defection has been recorded within the security forces. “There is neither a resurgence of popular protests from January 2026 nor internal fissure within the regime,” noted the Western diplomatic source.

“On the contrary, leaders are adopting a defiant posture towards the United States. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader, son of Ayatollah Khamenei and a radical figure rejected by the people, is both a sign of strengthening the hardest elements within the regime, especially the Revolutionary Guards to which he is close, and a depiction of stability and continuity in the regime’s political, ideological, and even familial realms in the face of what is seen as an existential conflict.”

According to information from the New York Times, the choice of Mojtaba Khamenei was reportedly influenced by several senior Pasdaran officials, including their new chief, General Ahmad Vahidi, military strategist Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari, former intelligence chief Hossein Taeb, and current parliament president and former commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. In contrast, Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, assassinated on Tuesday, and President Massoud Pezeshkiann advocated for a more consensual solution.

“The Iranian institutional system is based on the balance of powers and the existence of internal counterbalances to ensure it can function, even when degraded. Each authority has named its successors in advance to guarantee the continuity of essential functions,” analyzed military historian Pierre Razoux, academic director of the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (Fmes).

“What is at stake today in Iran, since it is not clear whether the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is capable or not of acting as an arbitrator [he was reportedly injured in an Israeli bombing], is the preservation of the velayat-e faqih [the power of the Iranian leader] and the role of the clergy in the decision-making process.”