In what measure are the lessons learned from an armed conflict reliable and generalizable, given that they are based on a contingent operational trajectory among other possibilities? In other words: does the Experience Feedback (RETEX) of a conflict tell us what wars are, or only what already has been this war?
The war between Russia and Ukraine is a particularly rich source of analysis for studying a high-intensity conflict between two technologically advanced states, with a wide range of modern weapons systems.
The main lessons drawn from this conflict are now well identified: the rise of drones, the increased vulnerability of tanks and helicopters, the growing exposure of logistical routes over long distances, and the central role of electronic warfare.
These findings have gradually emerged from the observation of four years of combat. However, if the conflict had evolved according to a different dynamic, it is likely that the conclusions drawn from these analyses would have been significantly different.
As an illustration, examining a credible alternative scenario allows us to measure to what extent another operational trajectory could have fundamentally changed the lessons drawn from it.
Alternative Scenario of 2022
Imagine that the operation carried out by Russian airborne units on Hostomel airfield was fully successful.
The facts are known. Russian airborne forces (VDV) conducted, at the beginning of the conflict, a heliborne assault operation on the Hostomel airfield, located north of Kiev. If the Russian paratroopers did manage to seize the airfield, they did not succeed in holding it. They were quickly counter-attacked by Ukrainian units – artillery, special forces, territorial defense forces, and reservists – who were in training in the immediate vicinity of the site.
Ukrainian artillery pounded the Russian positions, rendering the runway unusable, while special forces, supported by tanks and elements of territorial defense, launched the assault against a contingent estimated at between 200 and 300 Russian soldiers, lightly armed and just disembarked from their helicopters. The presence of these Ukrainian units was largely coincidental and did not seem to have been anticipated by the Russian high command. It is therefore not unreasonable to consider that they could have not been present, and that the outcome of the operation would then have been radically different.
In this alternative scenario, one can envision that the Russian airborne forces would have been able to hold the airfield long enough to allow the landing of forty Il-76 transport planes, then ready to take off from Russia. These aircraft could have transported between 1,500 and 2,000 additional soldiers, as well as light tanks, thus establishing an airborne bridgehead at the gates of Kiev.
It is evident that the course of the war would have been profoundly altered if Russia had succeeded in deploying over 2,000 elite soldiers in the immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian capital in a few hours, while ensuring an aerial bridgehead to reinforce and support this position. Would the capture of Kiev or the flight of the government have been possible? The question remains unanswered. However, the progress of Russian ground forces from the Belarusian border would most likely have been facilitated and accelerated.
Would the Ukrainian forces have been able to organize an effective defense before the arrival of Russian troops on the outskirts of Kiev? Again, no one can affirm it. However, it is plausible that such a situation would have considerably weakened the political position of the Ukrainian president. Escape, capture, opening negotiations, or on the contrary, a refusal to compromise were all possible outcomes, but in any case, the situation would have been significantly more critical for Ukraine.
Finally, one can envision an intermediate scenario in which the president would have left the capital to try to organize resistance from another part of the territory. Such a configuration would nevertheless entail a form of temporary power vacuum, likely to delay and disorganize the mobilization of Ukrainian forces and the establishment of a coherent defense to slow down the Russian advance.
If a ceasefire had been negotiated in the following days, what lessons would we have learned from this conflict?
Experience Feedback of an Alternate History
In such a scenario, the retrospective analysis would most likely have highlighted the central role of special forces and airborne units, as well as the decisive nature of helicopter-borne action conducted deep within enemy territory. The speed of the maneuver, combined with the high level of training of the engaged soldiers, would have been presented as a demonstration of the relevance and effectiveness of a limited force in volume, but extremely reactive and well-prepared, capable of avoiding entrenchment in a long, costly conflict both in terms of human resources and economically. In a way, this scenario could have shown some similarities with the one observed during the American operation against Venezuela. However, the military power of Ukraine – even in 2022 – had nothing comparable to that of the Venezuelan army, which was much more limited in capacity, poorly equipped, with poorly maintained equipment and a significantly lower level of training.
In this analysis, the role of drones would have been marginal, if not secondary. The role of helicopters would not have been called into question; on the contrary, they would have been perceived as a crucial vector of initial success. Consequently, the vulnerability of tanks would probably not have been identified as a structuring factor of the analysis.
The Experience Feedback (RETEX) from this short war would have been radically different from the one we are producing today.
However, would this RETEX have been « false»? No, to the extent that it would have been based, just like current analyses, on concrete and observable facts. It would simply have reflected a different operational trajectory.
A conflict only provides feedback on the events that actually occurred, not on all those that could have occurred.
Completing the RETEX
If this scenario falls into uchronia, is it nevertheless unrealistic? And are the lessons that could be drawn from this fiction to be rejected outright?
In reality, this fictional scenario places us in a significantly different environment from what is observed today in Ukraine, where the war has been ongoing for almost four years. It is part of the early stages of a conflict, potentially triggered with a certain element of surprise, before the gradual build-up of military and industrial capabilities.
In such a context, can one really imagine pre-positioned units immediately possessing hundreds or even thousands of drones ready to be engaged in combat? This hypothesis seems unlikely. The «drone war» as we observe it today has been built over time. While tens of thousands of drones are now used daily on the Ukrainian front, such intensity does not correspond to the initial phases of the conflict.
Even in the scenario where armies had significant stocks of drones, logistical and organizational constraints would imply, at the very least, several days before being able to engage these systems in significant numbers. And even if, the quantities available would not be comparable to those observed today. It is indeed difficult to imagine an army, not yet involved in an open conflict, having millions of drones in reserve, especially since the current conflict shows how quickly these equipment become obsolete. Their low unit cost generally comes with limited long-term storage capacity, both technically and functionally.
On the contrary, one of the factors explaining the high cost of many missiles lies precisely in their ability to be stored for several years, with a high likelihood of immediate availability and reliability at the time of use.
In these conditions, it seems reasonable to consider that at the beginning of a high-intensity conflict, the actually usable volume of drones – especially so-called «suicide» drones – would remain limited. «Traditional weapons systems would then retain all their relevance during this initial phase. With additional protection measures against the drone threat, armored vehicles and helicopters would have little chance of immediately facing swarms of unmanned aerial systems.
Of course, this situation would quickly evolve if the conflict were to last. However, it would likely leave some days, or even weeks, of relative freedom of action for the attacker. Moreover, unlike drones, an armored vehicle maintains its relevance over time. Even a tank designed several decades ago remains a formidable war machine, capable of delivering significant and enduring firepower.
The situation would be significantly different for the defender, probably much more constrained in movements and in the use of «traditional» armaments if the attacker decided, from the beginning of their intervention, to use drones massively. There would then be no symmetry in the capacity to use different weapons systems, which could accentuate the attacker’s initial advantage and make the defender’s position even more difficult.
Indeed, certain equipment could be confined to offensive operations triggered with an element of surprise. Such a reality would then imply structuring political and doctrinal choices, particularly in the decision to equip – or not to equip – with one type of military capability.
Ultimately, equipment decisions cannot be dissociated from the strategic choices they underlie. Prioritizing certain weapons systems implicitly means accepting the conditions for their optimal use. In other words, preferring capabilities whose effectiveness relies on initiative, surprise, and initial freedom of action involves assuming, at least in certain scenarios, an attacker posture. Conversely, renouncing these capabilities or relegating them to a secondary role reflects a different strategic positioning, more oriented towards defense or reaction.
Thus, equipment decisions are never neutral: they engage, beyond technical considerations, a strategic and political vision of the role one is willing to – or not willing to – assume in a future conflict.
Conclusion
It is important not to confine ourselves to a strictly deterministic reading of a single scenario to analyze the evolution of war in general. Tactical and technical developments specific to each conflict are as much the product of technological advances as of the particular context in which they occur.
As a result, it is particularly risky to too quickly dismiss the utility of certain equipment solely on the grounds that, in a given context, they have shown their limitations or revealed vulnerabilities. Pushing the argument to the extreme would be equivalent to concluding the uselessness of tanks solely after exclusively observing naval warfare.
Nevertheless, tactical and technical developments observed in Ukraine, especially in the field of drones, will have significant repercussions on future conflicts. However, this does not mean that armored vehicles – especially tanks – or helicopters, often criticized today, are destined to lose all usefulness in the future. Collective memory seems to have forgotten that during the Vietnam War, the American army lost more than 5,000 helicopters in combat, and the Soviet forces lost more than 400 in Afghanistan, more than in Ukraine. Moreover, losses of tanks during World War II are estimated at nearly 200,000 units, across all belligerents.
Therefore, let us beware of hasty conclusions: the observed events are just a sampling of possibilities, not an exhaustive representation of the reality of armed conflicts.
