In a high-stakes gamble with disastrous consequences, the New York Times reconstructs how, through a series of secret meetings, Donald Trump eventually committed the United States to stand with Israel against Iran. The American newspaper details a politically and militarily intense encounter: on one side, a determined Benjamin Netanyahu seeking American support, on the other, a relatively easily persuaded Donald Trump, drawn to the promise of a rapid, spectacular, and decisive operation. The narrative hints at a decision made within a very restricted circle, despite doubts and warnings from within the administration.
Reported by White House journalists Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman, authors of an upcoming book on the Trump presidency, the story delves into the sequence of events. It showcases how the American president gradually set aside the reservations of his advisors to follow his intuition and, above all, the Israeli interpretation of the power dynamics with Tehran.
It all starts on February 11, just before 11 am, when Benjamin Netanyahu’s black SUV enters the White House gates. The Israeli Prime Minister, advocating for a major offensive against Iran for months, is discreetly escorted inside. According to the New York Times, the ensuing meeting holds significant weight for what comes next.
Following an initial discussion in the Cabinet Room, Netanyahu moves to the Situation Room for the main purpose of his visit: a highly confidential presentation on Iran. Trump deviates from his usual seat at the head of the table and instead positions himself on the side to face the screens. Before him, the Israeli prime minister lays out his case.
Visible on the screen behind Netanyahu are David Barnea, the chief of Mossad – Israel’s primary intelligence agency – and several Israeli military officials. Around the table, the attendance is sparse: Susie Wiles, Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, General Dan Caine, John Ratcliffe, Jared Kushner, and Steve Witkoff. The meeting deliberately kept a small audience to prevent leaks, with even Vice President J.D. Vance absent in Azerbaijan.
Netanyahu spends an hour advocating the idea that a regime change in Iran is not only desirable but also within reach. He asserts that the Iranian ballistic missile program can be destroyed in a matter of weeks, leaving the regime weakened and unable to block the Strait of Hormuz or seriously threaten American interests in the region. After this presentation, the American president makes a decisive statement, as reported by the New York Times: “That sounds good to me.” For Netanyahu, the response amounts to a near green light.
The next day, February 12, the conclusions are shared in another meeting in the Situation Room, this time among American officials only. They break down the Israeli strategy into four objectives: assassinate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, degrade Iranian military capabilities, incite a popular uprising, and install a friendly government in Tehran. The Americans find the first two objectives plausible, but not the latter two.
John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, dismisses Israeli scenarios for regime change as “outlandish,” according to the New York Times. Despite acknowledging that political shifts can occur during a war, the assessment suggests that they should not be considered viable objectives.
J.D. Vance, back from Azerbaijan, also expresses skepticism. Initially advocating against strikes, Trump turns to General Dan Caine, who points out the Israeli tendency to exaggerate their plans, amplifying promises because they rely on U.S. support. While not dismissing the operation, Caine highlights its blind spots.







