The Chechen War and the Russian Military | By Emily Roberts

For over forty days, we have been following a war that is reshaping our way of life. If you are reading this and find our work relevant and wish to support a young independent editorial team in Europe, check out all our subscription offers at Le Grand Continent.

Donald Trump portrayed the war as a regime change war. Many Iranian leaders have been killed, including the Supreme Leader. Yet, the Islamic Republic remains in power. Has the Iranian regime emerged stronger from these forty days of war?

Despite the assassination of several leaders, the regime has shown resilience against two of the world’s most powerful armies, the American army and the Israeli army. In this context, the regime has survived, even strengthened, as they have demonstrated a planned succession for decision-making positions, sometimes up to three or four people.

Therefore, the elimination of a commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards did not lead to the neutralization of the Guards as a body since there was always a replacement ready.

The same goes for political figures, like Ali Larijani, replaced by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr in the position of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who determines the country’s strategy both internally and internationally.

Through these replacements, the hardest of the Revolutionary Guards have consolidated their authority and control over the country.

What does this control entail?

The Guards and their allies in Iran have increased their role during the war.

Take the example of Mohammed Qalibaf, who plays a central role as a former Guard commander. While he previously had a political role, he is now seen as someone who could negotiate with J.D. Vance in Pakistan if the negotiations continue.

The Guards’ narrative is to say: “We have protected Iran during this imposed war.” They use this argument to justify their increased control over Iranian civilian society, which has been greatly weakened due to the massacres in January 2026. Along with thousands of deaths, 50,000 people were arrested during these protests. Today, society is completely controlled by the Revolutionary Guards.

As a result, this war has strengthened the Islamic regime, especially the military within it, further weakened Iranian civil society, and increased the economic misery of the country.

It is difficult to understand who now controls Iran. Who are the most important figures today?

Mohammed Qalibaf is interesting to observe, not as the President of Parliament, because Parliament does not play a central role, but as a political figure with ties to the Revolutionary Guards and the police forces he once led. He has always had the ambition to lead the country and has run for president three times without success. This war is his last chance to emerge as a leadership figure, especially since he has also been endorsed by the United States as someone they could negotiate with.

Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr is also central, even if he does not seem close to Qalibaf. While both were on the front lines during the Iran-Iraq war as Revolutionary Guards, their paths diverged later on, with Zolghadr pursuing a career in the judiciary system and Qalibaf in local and municipal politics as the Mayor of Tehran.

Lastly, the third key figure seems to be Ahmad Vahidi, the former head of the Revolutionary Guards’ feared intelligence services, who now leads all the Guards. He represents a form of radicalization at the head of the Guards. After the deaths of Hossein Salami and Mohammad Pakpour, Ahmad Vahidi took charge of the Guards, advocating an even more radical line than his predecessors.

These individuals are the real leaders of the country. The President of the Republic, Massoud Pezechkian, does not seem to have real influence: what he said during the war had little echo.

What is the role of Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public?

It must be emphasized that Mojtaba Khamenei was elected under pressure from the Revolutionary Guards. Within the Assembly of Experts, nearly twenty-five out of eighty-eight members opposed his election, unprecedented for a body that typically makes unanimous decisions.

This situation is both unprecedented and expected, as Mojtaba Khamenei has no standing in the clerical institution or religious authority. He was therefore elected under pressure. For me, Mojtaba Khamenei does not represent the clerical institution but only the Guards. That is why it would be more accurate to refer to the “Guardians’ Regime” rather than the “Mollahs’ Regime.”

A photo of his injuries circulated and was quickly removed. Whether he is alive, severely injured, or not is irrelevant. In my opinion, we have moved beyond the wilayat al-faqih regime, or the government of the jurisconsult. Today, Iran has become a militaristic regime, where the Revolutionary Guards and other armed forces play a more predominant role than the mullahs.

“The war has strengthened the military power, weakened civil society, and increased Iran’s economic hardship.” – Azadeh Kian

What about the economic and social difficulties faced by Iranian society?

Unfortunately, the war has dramatically worsened social problems.

The material destruction is massive: according to the latest report from the Iranian Red Crescent, 93,000 buildings—residential and commercial—have been destroyed. This has resulted in 3 million displaced people or people deprived of housing.

Unemployment has skyrocketed, the cost of living has soared, and inflation stands at 83%.

Women are among the primary victims of this war. Many worked in the informal sector—bazaars or small shops—that are now closed. They have lost their income while having to support and reassure their children daily.

Psychological trauma, often overlooked, is devastating: living under the constant threat of bombings, even indirectly, creates unbearable anxiety for both children and adults. Women are at the forefront of this family distress.

I know what this means. I lived through a year of the Iran-Iraq war and remember the helplessness felt. When Iraqi planes bombed Tehran, there were no shelters. So people stayed at home, resigned, thinking, “If it’s our turn, we’ll die.” I’ve seen this same resignation in my friends and family in Iran. People have resigned themselves to death.

The situation is even worse than before because the Iran-Iraq war mainly affected the west and south of the country. Today, the bombings reach all major cities in Iran: Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad. Tens of millions of people are directly affected.

“It would now be more correct to speak of the ‘Guardians’ Regime’ rather than the ‘Mollahs’ Regime’.” – Azadeh Kian

After the announcement of a ceasefire, how can we imagine the future of relations between the state and Iranian society?

This would require the ceasefire to hold and then the creation of a lasting peace. But in the immediate future, my hypothesis is that the regime will emerge strengthened from this war. It is likely to remain in power due to the absence of a structured opposition capable of replacing it.

Initially, the regime will seek to maintain control over society by suppressing any signs of revolt, whether through protests or diffuse discontent.

However, it will also face a challenge: reconstruction. I mentioned the 93,000 destroyed buildings. To rebuild, the military and the regime will have no choice but to rely on Iranian civil society, on businesses. They cannot rebuild the country alone.

Would appealing to Iranian civil society imply a form of openness?

This evolution could happen, but not immediately.

We can think of a Pakistani hypothesis—not to compare the two countries, as the contexts are very different, but to provide an example of a system where the military holds most power, while civilians occupy symbolic or administrative roles.

Such a model would ensure a level of civilian accountability while adopting a less militaristic discourse to appease a dissenting civil society. It is conceivable, but many conditions must be met: first, a lasting ceasefire, then a peace agreement, and finally, the necessary financial means for reconstruction.

For now, I do not see the military relinquishing their privileges or power voluntarily, especially not in the current context.

During the war, there were often mentions of risks of separatist movements, especially concerning the Kurds. Can we speak of a risk to Iran’s stability?

Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu publicly talked about mobilizing Kurdish forces from Iraqi Kurdistan to invade Iran. However, this strategy faces several challenges. Firstly, Kurdish leaders in Iraq, like the Barzanis, rejected this proposition. Despite tensions with Tehran—especially Iranian missile strikes on their territory—they preferred to avoid antagonizing Iran, with which they have relatively stable relations. Secondly, Iranian Kurdish parties—whether autonomous or independent—also refused to serve as proxies for Israel or engage in this conflict. Several Kurdish organizations stated that they would not participate in such an offensive.

As for the Baloch, their situation is different. Some armed groups have existed in the region for a long time, and sporadic clashes with Iranian forces persist. However, there is no massive separatist movement among the Baloch. Religious figures like Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, highly respected in the community, do not support such a march.

In summary, attempts to instrumentalize ethnic minorities against the Iranian regime have failed—at least for now. The lingering question is: how will the Revolutionary Guards treat these minorities in the future? Their behavior will largely determine future dynamics.

“The war has weakened the opposition as priorities lie elsewhere.” – Azadeh Kian

What about Iranian opposition to the Islamic Republic?

This is a challenging question, but we can start with the example of the Shah of Iran’s son. His stance during this war has alienated a large part of his Iranian supporters. He supported Israeli and American strikes without expressing any compassion for Iranian victims. When children were killed in a school early in the conflict, he remained silent. However, as soon as American soldiers were killed, he sent condolences.

He has lost a portion of his support, retaining only the backing of Iranian Republicans and Democrats, who have come together during the war, both in Iran, with figures in prison and at liberty. However, this group is just emerging and, for now, does not represent a credible opposition.

The war has weakened the opposition as priorities lie elsewhere: rebuilding the country, rehousing the displaced, creating jobs for the unemployed, repairing destroyed infrastructure. In this context, it is hard to imagine Iranians massively taking to the streets to demand freedom and democracy.

That said, we cannot rule out manifestations of anger. But these movements likely will not pose an existential threat to the regime. They will primarily be expressions of social distress, not political revolution.