Veronique Chabourine, strategic analyst
In March, during the annual conference of European Union ambassadors, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called for a “more realistic and interest-driven European foreign policy.” The Commission advocates for a foreign policy that integrates security, economic, strategic partnership, and industrial resilience dimensions, including strengthening cooperation with partners like India, Canada, or Australia, and securing European supply chains.
Recent data on the structure of international power sheds light on the issues. According to the Real Instituto Elcano’s Global Presence Index, which measures the international projection of states based on economic, military, and soft power dimensions, the European Union is now one of the main pillars of international presence alongside the United States and China. In 2024, its global index reaches around 3,462 points, slightly higher than that of the United States. However, this presence is mainly based on economic factors, with the EU’s economic dimension dominating significantly over its military dimension. Nearly two-thirds of the EU’s international presence is based on its economic dimension. Europe also has a specific leverage through its normative capacity – often referred to as the Brussels Effect – which allows it to spread its regulatory standards internationally. However, the difference lies in the U.S.’ ability to control a larger number of strategic chokepoints in the global system – financial infrastructures, critical technologies, or digital networks – that allow controlling certain flows on which the global economic system depends.
In this context, the strategic challenge is not to eliminate interdependencies, but to rebalance relationships. The ability to occupy or control certain chokepoints becomes an essential lever to reduce vulnerabilities and balance power relations. According to the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements, the United States has a major lever through its financial centrality: the dollar still represents nearly 58% of global foreign exchange reserves and is involved in about 88% of international exchange transactions. China, on the other hand, has a growing influence in certain critical supply chains, such as providing over 60% of global lithium refining and over 80% of rare earth processing. These control positions are few – several analyses estimate that about twenty chokepoints now structure the global economic system. In this context, power no longer relies solely on the intensity of economic flows but also on the ability to control the infrastructures on which these flows depend.
In this context, the European Union appears particularly exposed to certain strategic dependencies. An analysis by the European Commission on industrial dependencies has identified 137 products for which the EU has a high dependence on external suppliers, including 34 considered critical. These dependencies include rare earths and certain critical raw materials, lithium-ion batteries, advanced semiconductors, various technologies for energy transition, and active pharmaceutical ingredients used in drug production. They also affect critical digital infrastructures and technologies, which have become essential for many economic activities. Although these products represent a small part of European imports in value, their importance is systemic: they are indispensable for the functioning of entire industrial chains.
This evolution is changing how states mobilize their economic power. In an environment where interdependencies can be turned into instruments of coercion, the ability to defend and project interests becomes a central dimension of power. The concept of “interest power” involves the capacity of an actor to mobilize its economic, industrial, and normative instruments. It fits within a logic of smart power applied to contemporary power relations – a balance between several instruments such as defense and deterrence capabilities, economic or coercive tools, and normative influence. Several recent European initiatives align with this evolution. The Chips Act, the Critical Raw Materials Act, and the Net-Zero Industry Act aim to secure certain industrial value chains and reduce European strategic dependencies. However, their scope goes beyond industrial resilience. The Chips Act could help the EU establish structuring positions in certain key segments of the global semiconductor chain, particularly in production equipment and essential technologies for the global chip industry. The Critical Raw Materials Act aims to develop European capabilities in the extraction, refining, and transformation of critical raw materials, sectors crucial for global industrial chains control positions. As for the Net-Zero Industry Act, it could promote the emergence of industrial and technological capacities in several low-carbon technologies – batteries, hydrogen, electrolyzers, or advanced energy equipment – aiming to structure the global energy transition. In other words, beyond strengthening the European industrial base and aiming to increase industry’s share to 20% of the EU’s GDP by 2035, the challenge is also to turn these industrial policies into levers capable of creating or consolidating true European chokepoints in pivotal segments.
These initiatives raise a more structural question: the EU’s ability to collectively define and organize certain industrial and technological priorities in critical sectors. Beyond the economic instruments themselves, the challenge is also political: it lies in the ability of member states to agree on common priorities and uphold them over time. From this perspective, the idea of a Europe “guided by interests”, raised by Ursula von der Leyen, cannot be limited to a mere diplomatic posture.
