On two occasions in nine months, the United States and Iran were on the verge of reaching a real agreement on the most divisive issue between them: the Iranian nuclear program and American fears that it might be a weapons program. It was a shock, but not a surprise, when, on February 28, just a few hours after the latest, most substantial negotiations, Israel and the United States once again launched an illegal military strike against the peace that had briefly seemed truly possible.
Source: The Economist, Badr Albusaidi
Translated by readers of the Les-Crises website
The Iranian response to what it presents as American targets located on the territory of its neighbors was an inevitable outcome, although deeply regrettable and entirely unacceptable. Faced with what Israel and the United States referred to as a war aimed at ending the Islamic Republic, it was likely the only rational option available to Iranian leaders.
The effects of these retaliations are most keenly felt in the southern part of the Gulf, where Arab countries that had placed their trust in American security cooperation now perceive this cooperation as a serious vulnerability, threatening their current security and future prosperity.
In this perspective, Israeli leaders seem to have convinced the United States that Iran had been so weakened by sanctions, internal divisions, and American-Israeli strikes against its nuclear sites last June, that an unconditional surrender would quickly follow the initial assault and the assassination of the Supreme Leader.
The biggest analytical mistake of the American administration has certainly been to get involved in this war. This is not the United States’ war, and there is no plausible scenario in which both Israel and the United States could achieve what they want. It can be hoped that the U.S. commitment to regime change remains purely rhetorical, while Israel openly seeks to overthrow the Islamic Republic and probably cares little about how the country will be governed, or by whom, once this goal is achieved.
The question facing America’s friends is simple. What can we do to get the United States out of this inextricable situation? First and foremost, America’s friends have a duty to tell the truth. It begins with the fact that there are two sides to this war that have nothing to gain, and that the national interests of both Iran and America lie in a rapid end to hostilities.
American leaders will then need to determine where their national interests actually lie and act accordingly. A clear assessment of these interests would certainly lead them to definitively and decisively put an end to nuclear arms proliferation in the region, ensure the security of energy supply chains, and create new investment opportunities given the region’s growing economic importance on the world stage.
It is by establishing peace between Iran and its neighbors that these objectives would be best achieved. These could undoubtedly be considered common goals for all Gulf countries. The challenge is to find the path that will lead to escaping the current catastrophe to achieve them.
It may be difficult for the United States to return to bilateral negotiations, as they have been distracted twice by the sirens of war. It will certainly be difficult for Iranian leaders to resume dialogue with an administration that has abruptly transitioned from talks to bombings and assassinations twice. But the way to escape war, no matter how difficult it is for both parties, may well lead through this resumption of talks.
Consider positive energy
The parties need an incentive to find the courage necessary to resume dialogue. This could be done by incorporating essential bilateral negotiations to resolve the central dispute between the United States and Iran into a broader regional process aimed at establishing a framework of transparency on nuclear energy, and, more generally, energy transition in the region.
This perspective could be attractive enough for all major players to fully accept the difficulties of dialogue in order to succeed together. This is certainly a path that Oman and its neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council could propose. Preliminary discussions could ultimately lead to measures aimed at restoring trust and achieving consensus on the role nuclear energy should play in the energy transition.
Badr Albusaidi is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman. He played a mediating role in the recent nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran.
Source: The Economist, Badr Albusaidi, 18-03-2026
