For decades, the balance of the Cold War rested on a paradox: avoiding a nuclear war while meticulously preparing for its outbreak. Through the declassification of archives, historians today are discovering the extent of the plans developed by the great powers to strike the enemy. These documents show how close the world has sometimes come to a global conflict.
The logic of nuclear deterrence
Following World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union entered an unprecedented strategic confrontation. The possession of nuclear weapons profoundly transformed military strategy. The objective was no longer just to win a war, but to prevent the adversary from triggering it. This logic of deterrence is based on the certainty that any nuclear attack would provoke an immediate and devastating retaliation. To make this threat credible, both camps developed extremely detailed plans outlining the targets, means, and timetable of a massive strike. These plans are regularly updated based on the evolution of arsenals and adversary military capabilities.
Plans of dizzying magnitude for attack
Among the declassified documents are programs that give a sense of this planning. In the United States, the plan known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, envisaged simultaneous strikes against thousands of targets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries as early as the 1960s. Strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear submarines were to act in a coordinated manner to destroy industrial centers, military bases, and strategic infrastructure of the adversary. Soviet strategists, on the other hand, developed similar scenarios targeting American bases and major Western cities. These plans were based on the idea that a nuclear war, if it were to occur, would be total and extremely rapid.
A world on the brink several times
Reading these archives also reveals how dangerous some episodes of the Cold War were. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 remains the most famous example of a confrontation on the brink of escalating into nuclear war. But other lesser-known incidents, such as false alarms in detection systems or radar misinterpretations, also nearly led to an uncontrollable escalation. In several cases, the decision of an officer or the prudence of a political leader prevented the worst. In hindsight, historians emphasize that the stability of nuclear deterrence relied as much on strategic mechanisms as on a part of cool-headedness and luck.
