Industrialization without Emancipation: The Limits of Canadas Industrial Defense Strategy

Under the impetus of Prime Minister Mark Carney, the Canadian government has undertaken a major reorientation of its defense policy. According to him, the dominant concept that our geographical position and alliances automatically guaranteed us prosperity and security “no longer holds.” Canada now intends to develop military capabilities so that “its defense never depends on others again.” The ambition, colossal given how the country’s defense was conceived and articulated around a close relationship with the United States, is clear: “Canada is shifting from dependence to resilience.”

It is within this perspective that the Canadian government unveiled its very first defense industrial strategy (SID). It aims to “maximize strategic autonomy” of the country by developing “sovereign capabilities,” as well as supporting “our resilience in case of conflict” and “reducing vulnerabilities in the supply chain” through diversifying defense partnerships. This dual objective is based on a severe analysis of ongoing geopolitical upheavals: “Long-held assumptions have been overturned – on the end of imperial conquest, the sustainability of peace in Europe, and the resilience of old alliances. In this uncertain world, it is more important than ever for Canada to have the capability to support its own defense and safeguard its sovereignty.”

In reality, this narrative is misleading because it masks the fact that the Canadian government does not actually intend to shift towards an independent defense of Canada. Despite the declared ambition to strengthen Canada’s strategic autonomy, the SID does not challenge the country’s structural integration with the American military and industrial architecture. It certainly proposes a militarization, but not a disengagement from the American fold. In the absence of a new defense policy making strategic autonomy a real ambition, Canada’s vast armament plan risks perpetuating its historical model of forces integrated with the United States.

This article develops an argument in three parts. First, it shows that Canadian defense has historically been built within a framework of interoperability and complementarity with the United States, both operationally and industrially, which limits the possibility of a potential sovereign reorientation. It then analyzes the government’s conception of strategic autonomy, largely reduced to a logic of production within Canada and hopes for intellectual property, without a clear redefinition of national security objectives. Finally, it shows that, far from announcing a rupture, the SID is part of a dynamic of continuity where the deepening of continental integration coexists with a dominant economic industrial ambition, revealing a partial and circumscribed autonomy.

Institutional Alignment

The ambition expressed by the SID suggests a profound paradigm shift. Indeed, the grammar of strategic autonomy has never structured the reflection on Canadian defense policy, which has thus far never highlighted the notion of autonomy, preferring instead the ambition of being a reliable and credible ally.

Thus, Canada’s defense policy has primarily been developed since World War II based on an approach of industrial and military integration with the United States. This integration operates at multiple levels, mutually reinforcing and deeply shaping Ottawa’s strategic choices. On the military and doctrinal level, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is not just a cooperation mechanism: it organizes a logic of integrated continental defense where surveillance, alert, planning, and coordination of responses to threats are organized on a North American scale. Early warning systems, intelligence sharing, airborne interception procedures, and quick decision-making mechanisms rely on interconnected command chains.

Similarly, Canadian military acquisitions have long been determined based on their compatibility with existing American architectures, whether it be maintenance, software updates, logistics chains, or employment doctrines. The desire for interoperability acts as a structural alignment mechanism for Canadian acquisitions by linking technological choices, modernization schedules, industrial suppliers, and budget priorities to the United States. This systemic integration within the American military ecosystem now manifests through the desire for “interchangeability,” which is the ability to use the same systems, ammunitions, or platforms as the United States. This logic favors the purchase of systems already in service within the US forces to reduce logistical and doctrinal frictions. It is in this logic that Canada plans to acquire several American platforms: F-35 fighter jets, HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, Aegis combat systems, MQ-9B drones, etc.

This logic of interoperability, and even interchangeability, with the United States should not come as a surprise: Canada still operates according to the strategic orientation set by the defense policy of April 2024. This policy notably aims to invest in military capabilities that allow Canada to ensure the security of North America “within the framework of a renewed defense partnership with the United States, focusing on the re-establishment of continental defense and deterrence in all domains: sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace.” This vision of deep partnership with Washington remains the guiding logic behind the ongoing recapital…