In their form, the open military operations in Ukraine since February 24, 2022, are reminiscent of “late industrial” operations. The armies are close, in their organization and methods, to the peak of the end of the Second World War – with a smaller force volume and some innovations that do not necessarily indicate a revolution. By not mastering the industrial art of war as expected, the Russian forces have not been able to fully utilize their potential, unlike the Ukrainian forces, which are bolstered by a powerful support coalition.
After a dynamic phase where the Russians initially had the advantage of power and surprise, the operations stabilized along a rigid front, similar to the battles in Belgium and France in 1914. As in that time, the resources used quickly faced diminishing operational returns, which is the definition of a Schumpeterian crisis. To break this impasse, the only solution is to disrupt the balance of forces through massive engagement of new resources, and especially through innovation.
Ambitious Russian operational model on weak grounds
An army is always a combination of men and equipment, within given structures and with a specific culture. The combination of these four elements determines what this army is truly able to face against the enemy.
In terms of equipment, Vladimir Putin’s army seemed to emerge from the post-Cold War crisis starting in 2010, and especially in 2015, with a new generation of very advanced equipment, prominently featuring the S-400 anti-aircraft system, Su-57 fifth-generation fighters, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, and the Armata T-14 battle tanks. A whole array sometimes unmatched in the rest of the world.
Not to mention the internal corruption of the Russian military-industrial complex, this technical modernization was however fragile. Budgetary resources and knowledge capital were indeed insufficient to simultaneously support the modernization of all military components – from a massive nuclear arsenal, large aerospace force, navy, to a massive air-land force – of a power that aims to be global. This modernization heavily relied on Western imported technology, a resource that dried up suddenly after the 2014 sanctions related to the annexation of Crimea. […]
PLAN
- Ambitious Russian operational model on weak grounds
- Facing the Russian threat
- The confrontation in depth
- The initial Russian air-land offensive and its failure
- Schumpeterian military crisis
Michel Goya is a former colonel in the Ground Army and a military historian. He recently published The Age of Leopards. France’s global warfare from 1961 to the present day, Paris, Tallandier, 2022.
