The Fury Fallen from the Sky: Strategic Analysis of the Aerial Campaign against Iran.

The verdict on RL and EF operations remains pending. Of the five declared objectives, regime change has failed; dismantling of the nuclear program and ballistic capabilities are partial successes, with the issue of 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium still unresolved; the destruction of the Iranian navy has been substantially impacted; dismantling of the regional network of Iranian relays has failed, with Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias remaining active after the ceasefire. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, an added objective out of necessity, has not been achieved, with oil prices remaining above $100 a month after the ceasefire, compared to $70 before the war.

The implications for European air forces are direct and not based on the relevance of the Iranian theater for European interests. They stem from the adaptation of RL and EF parameters to the scenario of high-intensity conflict against Russia, in a context where American strategic depth can no longer be taken for granted.

Three challenges arise:

1. The inadequacy of European SEAD capabilities and ammunition stocks against a much stronger Russian IADS. 2. The gap of two orders of magnitude between European inventories and the volumes consumed in 40 days of RL and EF. 3. The obsolescence of a model centered on a core of advanced platforms, which must give way to a complete set of capabilities – stand-off and stand-in effectors, multi-layered air defense, persistent ISR, and an industrial base capable of replenishing stocks at the rate of their consumption.

No European air force currently possesses this; no European coalition collectively has the required capabilities. The cost of this reconstruction will be significant. The cost of facing the next decade with a model tailored for expeditionary operations of the 1990s would be even higher in light of RL and EF.