Mediapart: What is the historical importance of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution for the country’s identity and defense policy? Céline Pajon: Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution contains two fundamental provisions: Japan will not initiate any war, and it will not maintain a conventional military capability. This article was integrated on the proposal of the United States after World War II, when they were administering the defeated country.
From the beginning, a significant portion of the Japanese political class wished to revise the Constitution, particularly this article. Since its establishment in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party [the dominant governing party in Japan] set out in its founding documents that one of its objectives was to revise this Constitution, with the aim of reclaiming Japanese sovereignty.
Despite being extremely symbolic, Article 9 was preserved. Amid the Cold War between the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc, Japanese authorities invoked it as a shield against American requests for the country to arm itself. Their goal was to invest in economic reconstruction rather than defense.
Until the 1960s, a series of political and legal norms were derived from Article 9: the three non-nuclear principles (non-production, non-possession, and non-introduction of atomic weapons on national territory); the principle of non-export of military technology and equipment; and the commitment to keep the defense budget equal to or below 1% of GDP.
What remains concretely of this article and these norms, as Japan seems to be increasingly “normalizing” on the strategic level?
It should be noted that Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were established in 1954. Not only have they expanded over the years, but a series of ad-hoc laws have been enacted to evolve their missions. The momentum has been clear since the 1990s, which also saw the country’s military capabilities strengthen.
A significant step was taken in 2015 when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe obtained a political reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow the SDF to intervene in certain cases where Japan’s survival is threatened, in support and protection of allied forces, primarily the United States and then Australia.
The norms derived from Article 9 have also been challenged. By the end of 2022, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced a doubling of the defense budget, recently reaching 2% of GDP and aiming to reach 3%. Since the end of April, arms export rules have been further relaxed, allowing the supply of lethal weapons abroad.
It is often said that Article 9 has been stripped of substance. However, it still serves as a safeguard when it comes to protecting against certain demands, particularly American ones, to intervene abroad in risky areas. For example, during her visit to Washington in March, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi explained to Trump that Japan couldn’t militarily engage to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz without a return to calm.
However, Takaichi is pushing for a revision of Article 9, but in a minimalist way. This revision would not touch the foundation of the article but would add a line to acknowledge the formal existence of the SDF. In fact, they increasingly resemble regular armed forces, theoretically prohibited.
End of 2022, would you suggest that Japan was undergoing the equivalent of the German “Zeitenwende,” meaning a “changing of eras” concerning defense and security. What triggered it?
The war in Ukraine, like in Germany. The February 2022 invasion was a real shock in the archipelago, used by Japanese authorities to make a number of historical decisions.
Prime Minister Kishida expressed concern that “East Asia [might find itself] in the same situation” as Europe, implying following an invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China. His government broke the taboo of the defense budget, which surpassed 1% of GDP, and announced that Japan would acquire counterattack capabilities. This decision reflected a new analysis of threats, with some offensive capabilities now considered essential for Japan to guard against a potential strike from China or North Korea.
Since then, North Korea has supplied troops to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, sent to fight in Ukraine. But this also has consequences for the Asian theater.
In recent years, Pyongyang’s rhetoric has hardened towards South Korea and other neighbors. The security alliance established with Putin is particularly worrying, as it has allowed the North Korean regime to acquire technologies and expertise to accelerate its nuclear and ballistic program. Japan is on the front line of its missiles.
Concerning the specific concerns of Japan regarding China?
The situation has deteriorated around the Senkaku Islands claimed by China, with daily passages of Chinese boats in the contiguous waters and even the territorial waters around these islands. Apart from the increased frequency of these incursions, the boats are getting bigger and more threatening. There are also increasingly frequent passages of Chinese aircraft carriers near Japanese waters as they transit to the Pacific. And finally, air incursions in Japan’s airspace.
This escalation of Chinese military activities is increasingly done in coordination with Russian forces, which is crucial and evident since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. In the second half of the 2010s, Japan had tried to approach Russia, but that is no longer the case.
Since last November, diplomatic relations with China have seriously deteriorated due to statements by Prime Minister Takaichi in Parliament, asserting that a naval blockade using force in the Taiwan Strait would be a “threat to Japan’s survival” and could justify the deployment of SDF in support of American intervention. Beijing seized on this declaration as a pretext to impose economic and political sanctions.
There is no equivalent of an Asian NATO, but you mention “a network of Indo-Pacific partners” in which Japan is included. What does this consist of?
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