China’s Silent Strategy: Waiting as the Art of War
Paradoxically, some Chinese strategists find themselves in a position where a quick resolution of the conflict may not necessarily interest them. China specialist economist Markus Taube summarized it as follows: “The longer the United States remains embroiled in this quagmire, and the more unsolved the problem remains, the better it is for China.” Significantly, Beijing rejected a UN resolution calling for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz.
The underlying logic is coldly calculated. Firstly, the war in Iran mobilizes American resources – military, diplomatic, and financial – that could otherwise be deployed against China. Secondly, the current conflict weakens Trump’s position domestically, thus reducing his bargaining power with Beijing on trade issues. Thirdly, Russia gains considerable profit from the conflict by increasing its oil exports to China, filling the gaps created by American sanctions. Following the decrease in Iranian and Venezuelan supplies, Moscow has become China’s main oil supplier. This is certainly not China’s first choice, but it provides a reliable alternative.
Fourth and final point: China has invested heavily in electromobility in recent years, aiming to reduce its long-term strategic dependence on oil. The war against Iran accelerates the political and economic arguments in favor of this transformation. Short-term difficulties are offset by a long-term strategic positioning.
Achilles’ Heel of the American Strategy: When Oil Weapons are Pointed Back at the Shooter
Trump’s strategy of using the Strait of Hormuz as an economic lever against China presents a fundamental flaw: it harms the United States itself. Rising oil prices directly impact American consumers. The national average price of gasoline reached $3.41 per gallon in the weeks following the start of the war. American inflation reached its highest annual level. Political pressure on Trump to lower energy prices again is significant, especially in light of the November 2026 midterm elections.
The idea that closing the Strait of Hormuz would penalize China more than other countries turns out to be partially unfounded after a deeper analysis. Thanks to its reserves, diversification strategy, and Russia’s influence, China is better positioned than many of its Asian neighbors, and even better than generally thought. Additionally, the spike in oil prices also affects European allies of the United States who, while benefiting from American LNG exports, are experiencing increased energy costs. As Handelsblatt pointed out in April 2026: “The Hormuz trap marks the beginning of a new geopolitical era; Iran, but also Trump himself, are using maritime routes for foreign policy purposes.”
A complete closure of the strait would not allow for a quick replacement of lost oil. Alternative pipelines from the Gulf region – the Saudi East-West pipeline and the UAE’s ADCOP pipeline – could jointly compensate for a maximum of 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day. Strategic reserves could provide an additional 6 to 7 million barrels per day in the short term. Even if all alternative solutions were activated simultaneously, a daily deficit of over 10 million barrels would still remain. This scenario illustrates why, ultimately, each party has an interest in a controlled opening of the strait, despite all geopolitical calculations.
Nuclear Poker: The Real Background Weapon
At the heart of this conflict lies Iran’s nuclear capability, which makes the dilemma so concerning for Washington. Before the war began, Iran had enriched uranium to 60%, far exceeding the 3.67% limit allowed by the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement. The Director-General of the IAEA, Mr. Grossi, described this level of enrichment as “quasi-militarily relevant” and estimated that the existing quantity – between 440 and 450 kilograms – was theoretically sufficient to produce more than ten nuclear warheads. As recently as April 2026, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization unequivocally stated that the demands of the United States and Israel to limit the enrichment program were “mere wishes that we will ignore.”
During negotiations in Islamabad, the two positions were sharply opposed: the United States insisted on a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment and the physical transfer of all highly enriched uranium abroad. Iran proposed a three to five-year moratorium and mentioned at most supervised on-site dilution. This difference is not purely theoretical: a 20-year moratorium would prevent Iran from developing a preventive nuclear strike capability in its lifetime. A five-year moratorium, in geopolitical terms, hardly represents more than a respite.
In late April 2026, Russia offered its mediation: Moscow was ready to take over the storage of Iranian uranium – a technically feasible option, as Russia already held Iranian uranium under the old Vienna agreement. However, Washington showed no interest in this proposal. The reason is likely strategic: storage in Russia does not definitively rule out the nuclear option, but only geographically relocates the problem.
Internal Divisions in Iran: Who is Actually Negotiating in Tehran?
An often underestimated factor in the analysis of the conflict is the power dynamics within Iran. According to an Axios article, the new Iranian leadership is deeply divided on the issue of acceptable concessions regarding the nuclear issue. On one side, the pragmatic forces gravitating around Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who publicly expressed a willingness to negotiate and mentioned “encouraging progress” in Geneva. On the other side, hardliners, represented by the head of the Atomic Energy Agency and some members of the Revolutionary Guards, reject any restriction on the nuclear program, considering it a national capitulation.
This division explains Iran’s often contradictory behavior: a Foreign Minister announces the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and less than 24 hours later, the Iranian military leadership reverses this announcement. Trump initially praised on TruthSocial that “the Strait of Hormuz is fully open and operational” and that Iran had committed to “never again close the strait”; then came the denial from Tehran. This back and forth does not reflect a cynical attempt at deception, but rather real disagreements within the Iranian power structure.
This division complicates the conclusion of reliable agreements. Even if a diplomat in Islamabad or Geneva agrees, it is difficult to know if the army – and particularly the Revolutionary Guards, who de facto control the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear program – will implement it. Past experiences of Iranian-American relations show that political leaders can be pragmatic, while paramilitary structures pursue their own objectives.
Contemporary Energy Geopolitics: Slow Paradigm Shifts
The war in Iran and the Hormuz dilemma are not isolated events. They are part of a larger paradigm shift in global energy policy. The era of “safe” energy supplies via established trade routes is waning. Maritime routes have become the main battleground of geopolitical power – they are no longer just conflict zones but active instruments of state foreign policy.
The Handelsblatt journal succinctly summarized this change: not only Iran, but also Trump himself, turned the blockade of maritime routes into an instrument of foreign policy. Iran closed the strait to tankers transporting oil to countries it does not support. In retaliation, the United States imposed a blockade on Iranian ports. Both sides are using energy flows as a weapon, causing collateral damage on a global scale. According to Handelsblatt, six weeks of war with Iran triggered an “energy supply shock of unprecedented magnitude for the global economy since the 1970s.”
In this new context, China’s long-term strategic investments – in electric vehicles, rare earths, and alternative supply chains – are a structural asset. Beijing has realized that its dependence on a single maritime route represents a major security vulnerability. The solution lies in diversification: Russian oil transported by pipeline, African oil, gradual electrification of transport, and domestic production of renewable energies. Additionally, China has maintained access to Iranian oil supplies through discreet diplomatic channels: Chinese ships have apparently received non-attack guarantees and, in some cases, have been able to circumvent the Iranian blockade by paying bribes.
The situation is particularly delicate for Europe. The continent is dependent on LNG imports, the prices of which have skyrocketed due to the Hormuz crisis. A full normalization of energy markets requires a political solution to the Iranian conflict, but Europe has virtually no direct influence on these negotiations. Traditional European mediators, such as Germany and France, are effectively sidelined.
Hidden Agenda: Energy Dominance at the Core of Trump’s Doctrine
Trump has never hidden that energy dominance was a central instrument of American foreign policy for him. From the first day of his second term, he declared a national energy emergency and has since been pursuing the goal of making American oil and gas the global benchmark in energy production. LNG exports increased by over 20% during his presidency. European allies, Japan, and South Korea have already committed to buying American energy.
The link to the war in Iran is direct: if Iranian and Venezuelan oil disappear from the market – whether due to war damage, sanctions, or deliberate blockades – a void is created. This void can only be filled by supplies controlled by the United States or its allies. Washington directly or indirectly influences oil production from Canada to Guyana to Venezuela – about 20% of global production.
However, as indicated from the outset, this plan has a systemic weakness: Russia is the third party that benefits. Moscow has the capacity to provide practically any resource in commercial quantities and can guarantee supply stability thanks to its geographical position and nuclear umbrella. Every “victory” Washington achieves over one of China’s energy providers – Iran, Venezuela, or others – strengthens Russia’s position, as Beijing then turns to the most reliable alternative supplier. This paradox of the Trump doctrine was clearly highlighted by Carnegie researchers as early as March 2026.
Between Agreement and Ongoing Crisis
The coming weeks will likely be crucial. Trump has called a meeting at the White House on Iran for Monday, April 27, 2026 to discuss the deadlock and possible next steps with his team. The latest Iranian proposal is on the table, and Pakistani mediators are ready. The question is whether Washington will bite the bullet.
Three scenarios are conceivable. In the first, the Trump administration accepts the Iranian proposal in modified form: a temporary opening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an extension of the ceasefire, with the nuclear issue explicitly being reserved for a second round of negotiations. This would relieve pressure on the global oil market in the short term but weaken the American negotiating position in the long term. In the second scenario, Washington insists on a comprehensive agreement: no opening of the Strait of Hormuz without substantial and simultaneous concessions on nuclear weapons. This could escalate the situation, but does not preclude the negotiation leverage. In the third scenario, Iran definitively breaks off negotiations and reinstates an active blockade, leading to a new spike in oil prices in the short term and further destabilizing the global economy.
From an economic perspective, the situation is clear: the world has a vital interest in a rapid normalization of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Every month of prolonged partial blockage costs the global economy hundreds of billions of dollars in additional energy costs, logistic fees, and productivity losses. In March 2026, the IEA decided on an unprecedented release of 400 million barrels from strategic reserves over a 30-day period – an emergency mechanism that does not question the fundamentally irreplaceable nature of the Hormuz maritime route.
As the British geostrategist Nicholas Spykman once put it, the Strait of Hormuz is not a geographic accident but the beating heart of the global energy system. Whoever controls this beating heart controls a crucial lever of the world economy. Trump, Tehran, and Beijing are all perfectly aware of this fundamental truth – which explains why this ostensibly regional conflict is actually part of a global chess game aimed at reshaping the economic and political power structures of the 21st century. Iran’s offer to open the Strait of Hormuz and postpone the nuclear issue is therefore less an offer of peace than a tactical masterstroke – a maneuver that forces Trump to choose between the price of his principles and the price to pay.
