The Unity of the Iranian Regime Put to the Test by Negotiations with the United States

Will Iran Negotiate with the United States in Islamabad?

The question of whether Iran will attend negotiations with the United States remains unanswered as the end of the ceasefire is expected on Wednesday, April 22 in Washington. Besides Iran’s intention to pressure the United States, behind this question lies the expression of diverging lines within the Iranian establishment. Despite the regime’s apparent unity, there are strong political tensions beneath the surface.

“On the Iranian side, the delegation is by no means homogeneous. It aggregates different factions of the regime, each carrying its own priorities, red lines, and interests,” confirms Adel Bakawan, director of the European Institute for Studies on the Middle East and North Africa, interviewed on Monday by Le HuffPost.

The dissensions within the Islamic Republic predate the current war. However, the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed on February 28 in American and Israeli strikes, has given these conflicts a new dimension.

“On one side, historically linked to the office of the Supreme Leader with the support of the Revolutionary Guards. On the other, the government, which includes the president, ministers, and deputies. Today, there is a real fracture between the two,” explains the specialist.

“The state, very conservative, has control over the country’s economy and international relations. It is stable because there are no elections, unlike the government which renews every four years and has a nationalist posture,” he elaborates.

After Ali Khamenei’s Death, the Power Vacuum

Since Ali Khamenei’s death, all these actors find themselves within Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. “The two entities confront each other and must vote on each decision by a majority: to continue the war, to engage in negotiations,” recounts Adel Bakawan.

Following Khamenei’s disappearance, security chief Ali Larijani, a consensus figure within the regime, tried to control both factions firmly. However, he was killed under enemy strikes on March 17. Mojtaba Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader appointed since then, is in uncertain health, raising doubts among experts about his ability to govern.

This power vacuum has led to a more vocal government stance. “Since Ali Khamenei’s death, nationalists claim that the current situation is the other camp’s fault,” states Adel Bakawan.

Among the main criticisms are Iran’s foreign engagements. “For the government, the focus should be on the country, and they are against deploying the Revolutionary Guards beyond the borders,” adds the specialist. This position sharply contrasts with the state’s desire to have a stronger international presence.

Economic Survival versus Security Guarantees

These differences directly affect negotiations with the Americans. “Each group monitors the others while trying to impose its negotiation framework,” specifies Adel Bakawan. The government prioritizes the Iranian economy, currently in distress. “These moderate currents prioritize lifting economic sanctions and reintegrating Iran into the international system, seen as essential for the regime’s survival in the medium term,” he explains.

“Conversely, more radical factions emphasize strict security guarantees: refusal of interference, demand for non-aggression, and recognition of Iran’s right to maintain and develop defensive military capabilities,” he adds.

At the beginning of the conflict, some disagreements were made public, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian’s apologies after a week of Gulf countries’ bombings. He had also promised to limit these attacks, a stance denounced by ultraconservative religious leader Hamid Rasai as unprofessional and weak.

Despite this, the regime quickly understood the importance of maintaining a united front, particularly against the United States and Israel. The rapid appointment of the new Supreme Leader was aimed at reassuring the enemy and preserving national unity, as disagreements between conservatives and moderates could be a negotiating card with the West.

While these divisions may weaken Iran’s position in the conflict, they could paradoxically be a source of strength domestically. “Perhaps thanks to this fracture, the regime survives. There will be no final blow as there is a real plurality within the regime. The anger of the population cannot be solely directed at one camp,” concludes Bakawan.