Between 2020 and 2024, Germany’s arms imports increased by 334%. According to SIPRI, around 70% of these purchases were from the United States. In 2024, Berlin spent $88.5 billion on defense, becoming the leading military budget in Europe and the fourth in the world, behind Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. This marked an 89% increase compared to 2015.
This historical rearmament, initiated by the “Zeitenwende” declared by Olaf Scholz on February 27, 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, primarily involved shelf purchases: readily available, quickly deliverable systems without the need to wait for five to ten-year development programs. The German Ministry of Defense formalized this priority in a doctrine document published in April 2023, where time became the absolute criterion for acquisitions. In this logic, the United States had an advantage that the European industry could not fill.
In December 2022, Berlin ordered 35 F-35A fighters from Lockheed Martin for $8.4 billion, approximately €10 billion with all equipment included. This decision was publicly explained as a replacement for aging Tornado aircraft, but the underlying crucial reason lay elsewhere.
At the Büchel Air Base in Rhineland-Palatinate, around twenty American B61 thermonuclear bombs are stored. Under the NATO “nuclear sharing” arrangement, Germany is obligated to maintain the capability of delivering these bombs. Only the F-35A is compatible with the new B61-12 version precision guidance deployed by Washington. Certifying the Eurofighter for this mission would have required an American approval process with no guaranteed timeline. In December 2025, 19FortyFive summarized this by stating, “Germany’s choice of the F-35A is a pragmatic response to NATO obligations in Berlin.” All 35 aircraft are assigned to Büchel.
For maritime surveillance, the Bundeswehr was using aging P-3C Orion aircraft. The Franco-German MAWS project was progressing too slowly, and the modernization of Orion was deemed unfeasible. Berlin ordered Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft for this purpose. Similarly, for heavy helicopters, Berlin chose the CH-47F Chinook to replace the CH-53G, as there was no equivalent European option available in an operational configuration deliverable within the required timeframe.
The same pattern was evident in the German Navy, where it was decided to equip its future F127 frigates, the largest ever built for the Bundesmarine, with American combat systems costing €10 billion. This contract extended the same logic seen in naval defense: lacking a European system available and certified at this performance level, Washington provided the heart of the warship.
In missile defense, the European Sky Shield Initiative, launched by Berlin in 2022 to unify allies around a common architecture, prioritized the American Patriot system for medium-range defense and the American-Israeli Arrow 3 for exo-atmospheric interception. France, advocating for the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, objected to this decision, but Berlin did not change its choices.
Noah Heinemann, a researcher at IRIS, noted in February 2025 that shelf procurement “is mainly used to access platforms available in the market with short delivery times.” In several critical areas, Washington was the only supplier meeting this criterion.
The United States’ share of the global arms trade increased from 35% in the period 2015-2019 to 43% in 2020-2024, as per SIPRI. European countries, including those with their own defense industries, heavily favored American purchases during this time.
The United States restructured its defense sector in the 1990s around five integrated groups: Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics. These companies produce on a large scale, deliver complete systems, and provide maintenance over several decades. In contrast, the European Union’s twenty-seven member states maintain twenty-seven separate force planning frameworks with persistent duplications across almost all categories. Factory lines, reduced during the periods of “peace dividend,” require two to five years to resume operations. In March 2025, Le Monde reported that French factories were running at full capacity, without the immediate ability to handle new orders.
Germany formalized this approach in its revised national defense strategy in December 2024: in areas where domestic capacities were insufficient, transatlantic cooperation was explicitly favored over solitary national development.
Since joining the Atlantic alliance in 1955, Germany has built its defense around American standards: communication systems, operational procedures, spare parts, and interoperable training. Purchasing American also ensures immediate compatibility with allied forces, a logistical and political argument.
This emphasis was accompanied by persistent mistrust of Brussels. Even after 2022, Berlin’s collective purchases were organized by building ad hoc coalitions between buying countries, bypassing European mechanisms. In March 2025, Le Monde noted that the “Atlanticist DNA persists”: Germany resisted reserving EDID program credits for materials designed and manufactured exclusively in Europe, as demanded by Paris.
