War in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia no longer wants to blindly follow Washington and turns towards Beijing.

As Donald Trump mentions a possible resumption of negotiations with Iran, Saudi Arabia reassesses its alliances and fears an extension of the conflict to major global trade routes.

The discussions between Iran and the United States could resume in a few days, according to Donald Trump on Wednesday, April 15. Among the countries urging the United States to lift their blockade of the Strait of Hormuz are the Gulf oil producers, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh, in particular, is increasingly struggling to follow the decisions of its American ally. Hence its pragmatic distancing from the American president, seen as both unpredictable and indifferent. For 40 days, like its Gulf neighbors, Saudi Arabia has been targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Even during the ceasefire, a strategic pipeline carrying oil to the Red Sea was damaged by a strike. Each time, the Trump administration allowed it to happen.

Today, faced with the emerging dialogue between Washington and Tehran, Saudi Arabia is relegated to the role of a spectator. There is no place for it, nor for Qatar or Oman, despite being historical mediators in the region.

Saudi Arabia is not “abandoning” the United States. But it aims to balance and diversify its alliances, as recently explained by its Saudi Foreign Minister. “To my knowledge, no Arab country formulates its policies based on the interests of others,” stated Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah. “We too will defend our interests and continue to formulate our policies based on our interests. Our interests lie in the West, but we also find them in the East.”

The diplomatic language is subtle, but the message is clear: Saudi Arabia no longer automatically aligns with Washington when Beijing emerges as a new significant ally.

Twenty years ago, China was just a simple client for Saudi oil, disregarding politics. Today, it is Saudi Arabia’s top trading partner, investing billions of dollars in the kingdom. China has also established itself as a key player in the regional geopolitical landscape (Beijing notably contributed to negotiating the ceasefire with Iran): all to reassure Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia is mainly concerned that this war, triggered by the United States and Israel, may extend to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another strategic corridor for global trade. Today, it is a vital export route for Riyadh.

Geographically, the strait separates the Arabian Peninsula from Africa: one must sail southward through the desert, crossing the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and then Yemen. Until reaching this narrow strait less than 30 kilometers wide. On the other side: Djibouti and Eritrea (according to an Arab legend, the name Bab el-Mandeb comes from the lamentations of those drowned by the earthquake that separated Asia from Africa).

Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. It is essential for the route linking Europe to Asia via the Suez Canal – and vice versa. Since the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, Riyadh channels most of its oil through this passage, allowing it to maintain its exports at a level almost equivalent to pre-war (7 million barrels/day). The kingdom has no other option.

However, the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is fragile: Houthi rebels, Iran’s allies, control a significant portion of the adjacent coastline. In November 2023, during Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip, they launched missiles and drones against ships: in three months, forty vessels were targeted, and Red Sea traffic and Suez Canal passage were halved.

So far, the Houthi militants have largely stayed out of the conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel; a demand from Tehran could make them more aggressive. Saudi Arabia was already at war with the Houthis between 2015 and 2022: it does not want a new confrontation. If the war persists, it poses a risk, for which it would hold the United States responsible.