Home Showbiz The Ukrainization of the conflict in the Middle East

The Ukrainization of the conflict in the Middle East

8
0

The American-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026 have triggered an unprecedented conflict since 1948, marked by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and a cascade of regional repercussions that have affected Gulf monarchies.

This conflict is not an imitation of the war in Ukraine: it stems from a structural convergence driven by constraints – cost of weapons, low-cost drones, informational saturation – which result in similar tactical and doctrinal solutions on different stages.

Iran has turned the war into a lever of global economic pressure through the closure of Hormuz, inaugurating a hybrid model of conflict where cognitive warfare and economic attrition take precedence over traditional military victory.

On February 28, 2026, the American-Israeli strikes on Iran and the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei plunged the Middle East into a conflict unseen since 1948. Thirty-two days later, on April 1, 2026, the conflict has exceeded all initial scenarios: Hormuz has been closed from day one, 18 civilian ships have been attacked, oil prices have surpassed $115 per barrel, Lebanon entered the war on March 2, and Gulf monarchies such as Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the Emirates have all been affected.

This conflict, engaging multiple stages simultaneously, is not just a regional crisis; it represents the first major conflict where operational methods, informational doctrines, and attrition logics revealed by the war in Ukraine are fully deployed. Not through imitation or deliberate transfer, but by structural convergence.

Before exploring concrete manifestations of this evolution, it is necessary to outline the analytical status of the concept of “Ukrainianization.” It does not claim that Iran, Hezbollah, or Iraqi militias have adopted Ukrainian doctrines, but rather that identical structural constraints push geographically and culturally distinct actors towards convergent solutions.

These constraints include the prohibitive cost of conventional weapon systems, the ubiquity of digital sensors, democratized access to low-cost strike technologies, and the primacy of the informational space as a center of strategic decision-making.

This phenomenon of convergence through constraints is not unprecedented in military history: the trench, the tank, and submarine warfare each emerged simultaneously under the pressure of tactical imperatives.

The speed of this convergence, accelerated by informational transparency, highlights a transformation in the Middle East since February 28, 2026, making it a major center of this dynamic.

The structural convergence first manifests operationally around a triptych: saturation of enemy defenses, low-cost economic attrition, and erasure of strategic depth.

Iran has opted for efficient systems rather than perfect ones: Shahed-136 drones, loitering munitions, short-range ballistic missiles. This approach aims at economically exhausting the adversary through continuous defense saturation.

Moreover, a Shahed-136 drone costs between $20,000 and $50,000 to produce, while a Patriot missile interception often exceeds a million dollars. This structural ratio transforms each Iranian salvo into an operation of economic warfare as much as kinetic.

The Iranian attack in April 2024, combining over 300 vectors in a single night, illustrated this doctrinal shift: most were intercepted. The goal was not the destruction of strategic targets but to demonstrate economic sustainability through saturation.

As of April 1, 2026, this logic reached its peak with the closure of Hormuz. Since February 28, 18 civilian ships have been attacked, traffic reduced from 51 ships daily to less than 3, and about 200 tankers are effectively stuck in the Gulf. Oil prices hit $115 per barrel, with Goldman Sachs experts predicting $150 in case of continued blockade.

For economists, a five-week blockade would erase the equivalent of ten years of global economic growth. However, the strategic dimension of the gesture is crucial: by closing Hormuz, Iran has turned Asian energy dependence into a leverage of indirect pressure on Washington.

The conflict in Iraq presents a strategic convergence with Tehran rather than operational subordination, contributing a distinctive element to the conflict. The technological advancement of these militias allows them to rival symbolically with regular armies at a fraction of the communication budget.

This configuration places Iraq in a unique position in the conflict, acting as a peripheral central point where logistic continuity and Iran’s strategic depth are negotiated.

The cognitive aspect of the conflict is a central theme, seen in developments in the military saturation war, indirect confrontation, and perpetual narrative and perception warfare.

This model structurally favors actors capable of rapid learning, mass production, and mastery of their audience’s resonance codes. The resonance concept highlights the importance of not just striking but ensuring the strike is seen and interpreted as desired.

In the current conflict, victory lies in imposing a new regional order through attrition, fragmented perceptions, and the management of long-term timeframes, not just in defeating the enemy militarily.

The closure of Hormuz for 32 days, transforming the global economy into a battleground, epitomizes this mutation. The postponement of Trump’s ultimatum to April 6 confirms the limits of the American position, raising questions about the peace process and the definition of victory.

Essentially, the conflict inaugurates a new era of “circles of war,” where victory is not about defeating the adversary but imposing a definition of victory through image management rather than sheer military superiority.