In the report submitted by Luis Vassy last December, the committee concluded that “Sciences Po is not adequately equipped to provide a meaningful and effective response to this geopolitical moment.” How do we define this moment we are experiencing? What makes it unprecedented?
Even though unique, this moment is part of a historical trajectory. The war in Ukraine cannot be separated from the history of the Cold War. However, there is still something unprecedented. Some observers have used expressions that are quite relevant to grasp the moment: “strategic rupture”, “new forms of conflict”, “the era of predators” (Giuliano da Empoli). All these expressions capture a part of the phenomenon. I would describe it as a tipping point. Terms that do not signify a simple change of position, but a loss of balance, sometimes a change in nature, capable of leading to a fall.
We are witnessing this tipping point at several levels, especially in historical alliances. For a long time, NATO provided a stability that Europeans considered guaranteed. No one can say what will remain of its political weight in a few years. Furthermore, another sign of this tipping point is evident in all initiatives aimed at undermining the institutional architecture of global governance. It is through this prism that we must interpret the creation of parallel international institutions, outside the UN system. China has been resorting to this for years, and now the United States are also joining in with the launch of the Board of Peace by Donald Trump.
We also see a spectacular remilitarization of military discourse and practices, a return to the question of resource extraction by force, something that was thought to belong to colonial and imperial wars… Lastly, the resurgence of arms races and the accelerated use of AI in the major sectors of defense, security, and diplomacy are disrupting not only the tools but also the norms underlying these practices.
In view of this strategic tipping point, what is Sciences Po lacking today to understand and analyze it?
The committee was very surprised by the extent of Sciences Po’s scientific lag, not only compared to our international competitors, but also compared to national institutions. The scientific production led in International Relations is not very visible; the quality of individuals no longer manages to hide the institution’s shortcomings. This is essentially related to a second factor: a far too small critical mass in the field. For example, less than 2% of the permanent faculty are involved in international security and/or defense. In short, our contribution to research efforts in these areas is limited.
Finally, the third element that alerted the committee is a detachment in the relationship between fundamental research on these issues and the world of practice. Even though Sciences Po hosts a large number of teaching practitioners, they interact very little with the research world. These two universes coexist in front of the students, but they hardly communicate and learn from each other.
Are other institutions, in France or internationally, better equipped? Business schools, such as ESCP, are even creating institutes of geopolitics… What models could Sciences Po draw inspiration from?
You are right; Sciences Po’s situation becomes even more untenable as other institutions have invested massively and continue to do so. The University of Leiden in the Netherlands, for example, created a school on security and global affairs in 2016. In just 10 years of existence, the permanent faculty has grown to about fifty people.
It is quite difficult to choose a model because Sciences Po’s functioning is unique, as research starts from centers: these are the basic units of the intellectual life of the institution. In most other developed countries where International Relations are recognized as a separate discipline, the functioning is rather articulated around schools or departments, with a substantial permanent faculty.
Several models have proven themselves and could provide inspiration without being imitated. For example, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, which is a model of fundamental research in contact with practitioners, within the university’s scientific parameters. In Europe, King’s College has a security school with a permanent faculty of over 100 teachers-researchers – certainly the highest concentration of researchers, professors, and students in the world. In Singapore or Canada, other schools have established themselves as centers of research and teaching in International Relations, security, and defense.
What are the main recommendations of the committee?
To enable Sciences Po to quickly position itself and regain an upward phase in these areas, the committee’s essential recommendation is the creation of a distinct, clearly identifiable, attractive, and visible structure internationally, agile and with room for growth. The committee believes that we should build on existing strengths, especially PSIA, but also on all our training assets – and there are many! The final form of the structure is obviously left to Sciences Po’s appreciation, but I note that for all members, the creation of an autonomous research center appears as the minimum scenario, the core from which a satisfactory offering for Sciences Po can be built.
